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208 R- B. HALDANE : which lasts, or as a process which is going on ; but our will is valid, and has a form of reality which cannot be described, because it is the last foothold of all description and agreement. Whoever has not known himself as willing cannot learn by description what kind of reality is given to us in that act of life ; but whoever has willed knows that the act means something more than the fact that some object of passive perception was in consciousness ; in short, he knows a reality which means more than existence " (p. 24). " In emphasising thus the will as the bearer of all science and thought, we have reached the point from which we can see the full relations between life and psychology. In the real life we are willing subjects, whose reality is given in our will attitudes, in our liking and disliking, loving and hating, affirming and denying, agreeing and fighting ; and as these attitudes overlap and bind one another, this willing per- sonality has unity. We know ourselves by feeling ourselves as those willing subjects ; we do not perceive that will in ourselves; we will it" (p. 23). "The least creature of all mortals, acknowledged as a willing subject, has more dignity and value than even an almighty God, if he is thought of merely as a gigantic psychological mechanism ; that is as an object the reality of which has the form of existence " (p. 28). These citations from the chapter in which Prof. Miinster- berg defines his general position will serve to show how completely he has identified himself with the second of the two great 2>osi-Kantian schools of thought. If we were to pause in order to ask him why he called his ultimately real subject, for which existence is, will instead of mind, he would probably reply by asking why it should be called mind instead of will. The truth seems to be that there is not the great gulf between the two schools that is commonly sup- posed. For both to exist as object for the subject is to exist only in a secondary sense, as dependent on and the outcome of an activity that lies beyond experience and is determinable only as what makes experience possible. Whether we call this activity mind, or whether we call it will, we mean that it is what cannot be presented as object of perception. The disciple of Hegel thinks that thought can apprehend its own nature, can disentangle from objectivity the logical process of which objectivity is but an aspect or pole. He tells us that it is only by going into the water that we can learn to swim. The disciple of Schopenhauer, and as such it seems right to rank Prof. Miinsterberg, tells us that we are directly aware of the fact that we will, although this fact is not and