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PROF. MUNSTEBBEBG AS CRITIC OF CATEGORIES. 213 interests and ideals, not by psychophysical laws. The study of the mental life of man from this other point of view is not a special science ; it belongs partly to history and literature, partly to logic and ethics and philosophy, partly to poetry and religion. Here may the teacher wander at his ease, and he will learn to understand man, while psychology teaches him only to decompose man. Have you never observed what bad judges of men in real life the psychologists are, and what excellent judges of men the history-makers and historians are ? " Let us turn to the chapter on the relationship between psychology and art. The author is here more hopeful of the uses of his science than he was in the case of education. He holds that psychology has, since the time of Fechner, made real progress in determining the uniformities of aesthetic preferences. He thinks that artistic prescriptions, worthy to be taught, have been and will still more be devised in the psychophysical laboratory. Blue and red are agreeable, blue and green are disagreeable : therefore combine red and blue, but not red and green. The golden section of a line is the most agreeable of all divisions : therefore try to divide all lines, where possible, according to this rule. But useful as this is, it is only an abstract and special point of view. It can take no cognisance of " the world of will-relations wherein grows and flowers art". Keal art makes us forget that the painting is only colours spread over a piece of canvas, and that the character of Hamlet is only the pro- duction of an actor. Art is rather the acknowledgment of the will of the artist. The rules and prescriptions of psychology are valid and useful. But they do for real beauty and art just what the police and the prisons do for morality and conduct. They neither take their places nor adequately express them. The conceptions under which history abstracts form the subject of the next chapter. The historian has aims which are directly antagonistic to those of the poet, for " the poet isolates, while the historian, like every scientist, connects his material ". But the materials themselves, the subjective acts, are common to the historian and the poet. Where the psychologist " encourages the reader to take the attitude of the objectively perceiving observer, the poet and the his- torian speak of facts which can be understood only by inter- pretation and inner imitation ; they cannot be described by enumerating their elements ; they must be suggested and reach somehow the willing subject which enters into the subjective attitude of the other ".