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PROF. MUNSTERBERG AS CRITIC OF CATEGORIES. 215 one whit more obscure than the terminology of the corre- sponding school of Hegelian critics, it has the merit of emphasising a side of reality, the aspect of practical as distinguished from theoretical activity, which recedes from the Hegelian point of view. And then Prof. Miinsterberg has done the work all over again in more senses than one. Not only has he used new terminology and sought like Prof. Ward in his recent Gifford lectures, written with a purpose which is not dissimilar -to do without the use of words which are not significant merely because they are technical and uncouth, but he has brought to bear on the criticism of categories what it most of all needs at the present time, the special scientific knowledge without which no great progress in it can be made. That one of the foremost psychologists of our time should have examined the limits of his own methods in the calm and dispassionate spirit of this book is a good and rare thing gained. That he should have done it from a wholly fresh point of view, and have brought to the criticism of his categories such a grasp as he has shown of the methods which a great meta- physical system has provided for inquiry into the problem of ultimate reality is a still better and rarer thing. So much for the very great service which the author of this book appears to me to have rendered. But at this point one is forced into criticism. The cardinal and most striking conclusion which he reaches is that the psychologist investi- gates, not the real will but a complicated and highly artificial substitution for it. He treats the will as though it consisted of a series of sensational elements, and this the psychologist, if he is a disciple of Prof. Miinsterberg, does, knowing that the real will is not even capable of description in the language which he employs. " We are blind," says Prof. Miinster- berg, " if we forget that this transformation and construction is itself the work of the will which dictates ends, and the finest herald of its freedom " (p. 32). If this be all, then surely we are, as Schopenhauer did not scruple to assert, the mere sport of what for us is and always must remain, blind and unintelligible. Prof. Miinsterberg seems to feel this. For in other passages, e.g., at page 22, and in the preface at page vii., he says that the transformation which psychology makes is worked out for " the ends of logical thinking " and for " special logical purposes in the service of our life ". It is not easy to reconcile these statements. If the will be not the same thing as logical thinking, and it is plain that from the point of view of Prof. Miinsterberg it cannot be, the old reproach, often before made against the school of Schopen-