VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. viii., No. 0. J. G. Schurman. ' Kant's a priori Elements of Understanding.' in. [Apart from the analogies of experience, not yet considered, nothing is left of the entire Analytic but the demonstration of the presence in all experience and knowledge of the activity of a unitary self-consciousness. We now pass to substantiality and causality : reciprocity may be omitted. As regards the former, Kant failed to see that the notion of substance is not an epistemological condition, but a scientific hypothesis. So with causality : Hume transformed the old anthropomorphic conception of it into that of insubstantial events temporarily related. Kant appropriated this view, but sought to extract the causal principle a priori from the pure category of dependence. And even if Kant is so far justified that the ideal of the new causation is to subordinate the laws of nature to the logical principle of ground and consequence, the relation between logical thought and the order of cosmical events could never transcend analogy.] W. Caldwell. ' Von Hartmann's Moral and Social Philosophy. i. The Positive Ethic.' [Analysis of Das sittliclie Bemuitsein. (1) Brief critique of hedonism and of objective morality (ethics of feeling and taste). (2) Objective morality as heteronomous needs no comment; as rational morality, it " inevitably collapses into the ethic of the ' end ' ". (3) Social morality, the programme of social democracy, implies the general- happiness principle : happiness and enjoyment are more cared for than culture and development. Or, if not, it is culture and development of heart and character (not of intellect) that are desired, and the ethical standard has altogether changed. The evolutional philosophy is respon- sible. (4) We may now look, with Hartmann, for a superhuman end to human evolution; or we may seek a deeper correspondence between the aims of personal and social evolution. Hartmann has, in any case, broken up the apparent objectivity of the notion of social development as the supreme end of conduct.] J. D. Logan. 'The Absolute as Ethical Postulate.' [We are free, in so far as our morality on its inner side passionately reaffirms the ideals of the absolute. And " whether the individual's days be few, or whether he live again in another world, he is just as mortal or immortal as he can be, i.e., so far as he, by his active co-operation with the mind and will of God, perfects the life of the absolute ". The teleological world is constituted by the conscious relation of the world of the absolute as such and our describable world as such; and finality is the category of our inmost being.] G. A. Cogswell. ' The Classification of the Sciences.' [The attempts of Comte. Spencer, Wundt, with criticism. "A true scheme of classification should be ex- plicitly two-dimensional, having reference both to the logical nature of the mental activity involved, and to the distinctive character of the different spheres of reality." Scheme based equally upon differences of method and of object.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books.
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