Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/519

riir: N<n:i i, si 1.1 . i K . .MI:, however, the centre of emotional gravity, so to speak, lies decidedly on the latter, the altruistic, side. How then does the conscious or quasi-conscious force at the back of the external organisation of society confront this difference of bias, as it may be termed, between the individualistic and ' universalistic ' tendencies ? Surely the facts of Sociology all go to prove that it employs correspondingly distinct methods of getting the utmost use and value out of each as follows. The principle of social co-operation to take the case first of the tendencies having primarily and character- istically an altruistic bias it actively encourages by the founding of institutions intended to foster a normal obser- vance thereof either by positive or by quasi-negative, that is, punitory means. On the other hand, as regards the prin- ciple of social, that is, of just and fair, competition, this, though in ultimate tendency likewise altruistic and therefore fraught with vital interest to society, is notwithstanding left, on account of its primary association with the indivi- dualistic proclivities, to the normal prompting of these pro- clivities themselves, unabetted by any considerable extraneous aid in the shape of the exhortation or praise of others. In other words, the members of society compete of their own accord for prizes that seem to come of their own accord to the successful. Meanwhile the ideal result of this twofold observance of principle, though due to quasi-independent impulses, will be not merely similarly but identically normal. By an allowable fiction, resembling that which makes the political sovereign ' command what he permits,' we may say that Society in its capacity of the external moral sanction ordains the struggle between its members within certain limits to a no less marked and important extent than within certain limits it forbids it. Normal moral action, then, as tried by this external test a test which evolutionary as contrasted with purely introspective Ethics has assuredly no right to reject is composed of action primarily self- regarding and action primarily other-regarding, and, accord- ing to the unanimous verdict of the ages, cannot 'afford to dispense with either ' moment '. But what, it may be asked, if we prefer to appeal to the internal test of Conscience ? May we not at any rate identify Conscience with the Tribal Self? The reply to this must be Certainly not, if you understand by Conscience the ' Moral Sense ' as a whole, that is, the Moral Ideal so far us it presents itself immediately in feeling. You may of course identify the two as Clifford does, if you retain his terminology with an altered meaning. The crucial point of difference,