Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/572

IX. PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. ix., No. 2. E. B. MacG-ilvary. ' Society and the Individual.' [Individualism makes society a mere compound; communism makes the individual a mere tool. We sub- stitute for them the ' society of persons,' the view that the social unit is the socius. Such a view reconciles the antithesis ; is borne out by the psychogenesis of the self ; and explains our need of social confirmation of opinions. Applications : the seat of sovereignty is both state and in- dividual, there is reciprocity of dependence ; natural rights of the individual go hand in hand with the social status in which they are vested ; justification of capital punishment.] A. K. Rogres. ' The Hegelian Conception of Thought (l.;.' [For Green, reality tends to become nothing but a system of relations. This may work for objects ; it does not work for selves. Let us then see what ' thought ' means. It may mean the process of thinking ; or ' thought ' as distinct from ' perception ' within this process ; or abstract thought, relations and concepts. Psy- chological examination of the relation between thinking and perceiving ; transition to the thought-world of the Hegelian. " Hegelianism as such is based upon the essential convertibility of existence for knowledge and existence for experience ; so that the universe is in no sense a reality which is brought home to us by a thought distinct from it, ... but is in its only possible meaning immediately present in the very thought experience which constitutes our lives." All that is true in this is that, if we are to have a good theory of the nature of things, we must admit the real application to them of certain fundamental categories which our explanatory thinking employs.] A. Lefevre. ' Self-love and Benevo- lence in Butler's system.' [In these two principles, Butler is " simply recognising the fundamentally rational character of the egoistic and altruistic tendencies in human nature ". By the conception of a social self and common interest, he transcends the dualism of interested and disinterested action. Self-love and benevolence are methodologically distinguished ; really, they are synthetised in one general principle of our nature.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. ix., No. 3. D. G. Ritchie. 'Nature and Mind : Some Notes on Professor Ward's Gifford Lectures.' [(1) Physical " To make the exactest of sciences impossible seems a strange way of making rational theology possible. . . . The existence of a pervading intelligence in the universe is rather proved by the exactness of the sciences of quantity than by a doubt as to their truth." (2) Biological. Ward's teleological factors of evolution " do not seem clearly to prove mind in the individual animal; or else they will prove soul in every- thing, and the distinction between living and dead matter disappears ". (3) Psycho-physics. Reconstruction of parallelism, "more on the lines of Leibniz than of Spinoza". Explanation in natural science is confined to the giving of material causes. The universe is both mechanical and teleological. ;4> Ward's refutation of dualism does not get over "the gap he himself has made between living experience and conceptual