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PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 55 comprehensible manner the relations of the terms to one another ; other mathematical symbols would also be applic- able. 91. Suppose, e.g., it was decided to determine the concept of cause as a particular case of the logical relation of a whole to its parts, then the whole might be symbolised by a square, the parts by any number (e.g. 3) of inscribed squares with the same centre of gravity ; the particular relation of causality could then be represented say by con- struction of the diagonals running through all. From this we may for the sake of argument develop the concept of real possibility and differentiate it by an inscribed cross, the concept of the will again by a circle drawn around this whole square, that of the social will by one or more concentric circles with greater diameters, etc. Such a definition and construction of concepts would make them as it were prototypes, and would distinguish them sharply from the vague general ideas which in their infinite manifoldness are generally connected with the corresponding words. They would represent an instrument applicable in every language, in every system of thought, and would impress them upon the student as fixed associations, armed with which he would go forward to the observation and analysis of reality. 92. But for the realisation of such an idea, which might easily be spun out further, there is necessary before all a localised source, which would possess not only the capacity of constructing it, but also the authority to make it accepted. Such an authority can never be that of a force, like that of political power ; it can find its basis only in its actual achievements, and in the general opinion which recognises them. Now, from every point of view the scientific work of our time, especially the enormous works of collection, generalisation, registration among which belong also ter- minological classification and labelling demand consulta- tion, co-operation, organisation. The given form for such a learned body is the academy. What the national academies were meant to do for the natural sciences, and to a con- siderable extent have done, that must be set before an international academy to achieve for the mental sciences. The former were based upon the material practical interests of statesmen and citizens for the development of trade and industry ; trade, industry and science have bound together the great political bodies, in which the nations stand over against each other, to a large extent in jealousy and hostility. The international academy must, by the fulness and wealth of its life, be as different from those which from their birth