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146 NOTES AND COEEESPONDENCE. I cannot then explain away the evidence of Plato's preference of volun- tary to involuntary sins. Does not such preference, however, conflict with his principle, ' No man is voluntarily bad "I Certainly it does: but this does not cancel the possibility or the fact of their coexistence in his mind under favour of some inexactitude of phrase. The key to the riddle is found in the ambiguous range of the term fKova-iov. Do I will whatever I intend ? or only what I wish ? If the former, then in all the foreseen evils of my wrong-doing I am voluntarily bad. If the latter, my aim is at some good, seized at the price of undesired ills ; I will an act that is bad, but it is not the badness that I will. Did I see it as it really is, I should recoil from it with hate. While both these usages are found in Plato, they finally disengaged themselves from one another ; and in the Laws he will no longer allow the epithet " voluntary " to be applied to " wrongs," but only to the " hurts " involved in them ; and carries out to its consequences the doctrine that the " bad are always involuntarily bad " (ix. 860 D. 863). Since I used the word pravity merely as a collective term for depraved acts, I had better have chosen a plural common noun than a singular abstract, which unintentionally seemed to jostle the Socratic maxim. In ascribing a modified meaning to the tripartite division of the soul on passing from the Phcedrus to the Republic, I am not conscious of going beyond the limits of Prof. L. Campbell's remark that there is "ground fur caution in comparing the two steeds of the Phcedrus with the Spirit and Desire of the Republic and Timceus. The Phcedrus, in common with these dialogues, asserts the existence of higher and lower impulses in human nature ; but there is no sufficient ground for supposing that, when Plato wrote the Phtedrus, he would have defined them precisely as they are defined in the Republic." (See Encycl. Brit. Art., ' Plato,' 202 b.) And as, among his deviations from the Socratic ethics, he came to admit a virtue of haint as well as of insight, and invoked a power to hold each of the three parts of the soul to its business, without meddling with the rest, it seems simple enough to invest the Reason, liable as it was to be taken as Specu- lative, with a function of new aspect that makes it also Practical. On the remaining paragraphs I have nothing fresh to say ; and I take leave of my respected reviewer with thanks for his criticism, thanks bright and pleased, no doubt, but not less true, for its severity. JAMES MARTINEAU. PROF. TH. LIPPS'S " GRUNDTATSACHEN DBS SEELENLEBEXS ". Prof. Th. Lipps of Bonn has written at considerable length to complain that his reviewer in MIND, Vol. x. 605 failed to give any adequate notion of the scope of his Grandtatsachen des Seelenlebens. There is ground for the complaint, though the fault lies less with the reviewer than with the too narrow limits to which, for so extensive a work (70!) large-sixed pp.), he was confined. What reparation is possible, is now made to Prof. Lipps by subjoining the larger (expository) part of his communication, which will have the more interest for readers of this Journal as coining from one who, by his own allowance, has worked so much upon the traditional lin English psychology : "The work BeelU l<> give the outlines of a pure Psychology, that is to say, of a psychology which, without metaphysical presuppositions as to the "essence" of the soul and without physiological hypotheses, proceeds only upon that which results immediately from contemplation of the pr.n of consciousness, or can be concluded from them by means of the law of causality. Psychology, in such case, >{ have recourse to unconscious mental p -id this universally. But of these also the science asserts only what it may and must assert on the ground of conscious