Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/172

PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 161 mena which are in no demonstrable connexion with reality. The failure to recognise self-consciousness as a stage of psychological experience leads not only to a failure to reach the alternate synthesis of experience, but renders it im- possible to explain the simpler forms of psychological experi- ence. This failure of Kant teaches us another lesson also, in that, as already stated, it was due to abandoning his real method, which was psychological, consisting in the self- knowledge of reason as an organic system by reason itself, and setting up a logical standard (in this latter case the principles of non-contradiction and identity), by which to determine the totality of experience. The work of Hegel consisted essentially in showing that Kant's logical standard was erroneous, and that, as matter of logic, the only true criterion or standard was the organic notion, or Begriff, which is a systematic totality, and accordingly able to ex- plain both itself and also the simpler processes and princi- ples. That Hegel accomplished this work successfully and thoroughly there can be to the writer no doubt ; but it seems equally clear that the work of Kant is in need of another complement, following more closely his own con- ception of method and of philosophy, which shall consist in .showing self-consciousness as a fact of experience, as well as perception through organic forms and thinking through organic principles. And it seems further that, only when this has been done, will, for the first time, the presupposi- tions latent in the w r ork of Hegel, which give it its convincing force and validity, be brought out. Again, it seems worthy of note, that the late Prof. Green (of whom the writer would not speak without ex- pressing his deep, almost reverential gratitude), when fol- lowing out Kant's work from its logical side, hardly escaped Kant's negative results. (By Kant's logical method we mean the inquiry into the necessary conditions of experience ; by his psychological method the inquiry into the actual nature of experience.) After his complete demonstration of con- sciousness as the final condition, synthesis and unity of all that is or is knowable, he finds himself obliged to state (Prolegg. to Ethics, p. 54) : " As to what that consciousness in itself or in its completeness is, we can only make negative statements. That there is such a consciousness is implied in the existence of the world ; but what it is we can only know through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent experience." Had he begun from the latter statement, and shown as matter of fact that this universal