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ON THE STUDY OF ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE. 183 introduce by way of example) but merely suggesting that the use of the synonym is (1) unnecessary, and (2) suggestive of controversy. 17. I turn now to the special objection to these defini- tions on the score of their involving consciousness as an essential element. On this head Mr. Romanes to some extent disarms criticism by frankly confessing that the criterion of consciousness is practically inapplicable. " No doubt," lie saj r s, " it is often difficult, or even impossible, to decide whether a given action implies the presence of the mind-element i.e., conscious as distinguished from unconscious adaptation ; but this is alto- gether a separate matter, and has nothing to do with the question of denn- ing instinct in a manner which shall be formally exclusive, on the one hand of reflex action, and on the other of reason " (An. Int., pp. 11-12). The facts of the case are these. The more frequently an action is performed the more automatic (instinctive, as we often say) does it become, the more does it tend to pass into stereotyped organic action. Those actions which have been performed, not only by the individual but by a long line of ancestors, whose organisation he inherits, are, or very soon become, completely, or in a very high degree, automatic. On the other hand, those actions which the individual has performed but seldom are effected with difficulty, owing to the imperfect connexions established in the nervous me- chanism. And this is the implication. Since the intelligent acts of the individual have a tendency to become automatic and unconscious, and since among human beings those actions which are performed in virtue of the possession of an in- herited organisation are, or have a tendency to become, auto- matic and unconscious, does it not seem in a high degree probable that some of the instinctive actions of the lower animals, performed at once, and without any process of learning by the individual, in virtue of the possession of an inherited organisation perfectly adapted to perform the necessary response does it not seem highly probable, I ask, that these instinctive actions, so perfectly automatic, are also unconscious? May not lapsed intelligence carry with it, in some cases at least, lapsed consciousness ? And does it not seem unwise, in view of these facts, and in view of the difficulty of applying our complex human conscious- ness to the problem of mind in the lower animals, to define instinct as reflex action into which is imported the element of consciousness ? While admitting therefore that Mr. Eomanes's distinctions are absolute in theory, and agreeing with him that they are