Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/213

202 G. S. FULLERTON : CONCEIVABILITY AND THE INFINITE. that I cannot call a particular line infinite, provided I have some proof for the fact other than its conceivability, and that I cannot know my conception to be in harmony with the reality. Suppose that, either from testimony, or by means of some a priori chain of reasoning, I have good reason to believe a given line endless : I can conceive the line as without end, and I may know my conception, al- though it does not represent the total content of my con- sciousness when at any moment I gaze upon this or that part of the line, to be a true and real conception, and in harmony with my experience as I pass over the line ; and I may be certain that, however long my experience may continue, it will yet not prove incompatible with the con- ception I have formed. In this sense any infinite object is conceivable, and there would seem to be no other conceivable way in which we could conceive it : an infinite object which could be known as a whole is not even an object of thought, for the elements indicated by the words cannot be so put together as to express a meaning. But the conception of the infinite, rightly defined, contains in it nothing either contradictory or beyond the grasp of the human mind, and is, indeed, a very common conception, as is evidenced by use of the word in literature ancient and modern, to say nothing of its constant occurrence in the debates of those very philosophers who find the conception such a stone of stumbling. And that the conception is a real one, having a real consonance with experience, those who hold to the Christian doctrine of Immortality will not be slow to maintain.