Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/254

J. C. MURRAY, A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. 253 No divisions within philosophy are absolute. Separation of one branch from another rests merely on restriction of aim, on adop- tion of some particular point of view. But so soon as it is ac- knowledged that relative divisions within the sphere of philosophy as a whole are to be admitted, it becomes barely possible to find any other ground of division than the purely logical one : the order of the parts should correspond to the involution of the notions implied. The complex, that in the isolated statement of which manifold assumptions are inevitable, cannot be regarded as the fundamental, and its treatment cannot be looked upon as that to which all others refer. That the matter of psychology occu- pies this position of highly complex object is hardly, I think, denied. That the psychologist has to employ from the outset certain notions and to draw certain distinctions, justification of which has either to be found elsewhere or in his own science if he allows it to expand till it becomes synonymous with philosophy at large, an expansion, as before said, perfectly intelligible, this, too, seems generally admitted. Probably any opposition to it rests on the common but illegitimate identification of ' subjective' with ' psychological ' ; an identification, however, peculiar to the English tradition, and not to be found in any of the great con- structive philosophies, either ancient or modern. At the same time it may be contended and the truth of the contention in its general terms must be unhesitatingly granted that the logical order of the several branches of philosophy does not determine their didactic order. We are familiar, in respect to the objective sciences, with the practical application of the Aristotelian maxim, and we make no hesitation there in employ- ing a partial presentation of some body of truths, adapted to the stage of mental power rather than to the systematic relation in which it stands to the whole. The same practice, it may be claimed, should be followed in philosophical education. Let us begin there with what is nearest to the learner's own experience, in the hope that the treatment, though admittedly imperfect, will form the basis on which a more complete view may after- wards be rested. Even if a complete view of the elements, processes and forms of development of the mental life be not capable of presentation as an introduction to philosophical re- flection, why should not the same hold good in respect to psy- chology that is acknowledged in regard to, say, theoretical physics, or botany ? Elementary mechanics is intelligible as an introduction to the higher researches, and can be presented in a fairly systematic fashion. The student of botany begins with concrete facts, and gradually pushes onwards to insight into the naturally prior laws, elementary statement of which is im- practicable. Why should there not be an empirical introduction to psychology, a general treatment of the well-marked and familiar distinctions in the forms and stages of the mental life a treat- ment confessedly imperfect, yet sound within its own limits, and