Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/260

C. HADDON, THE LARGER LIFE. 259 with Carlyle as Prophet, who excelled in the power of uttering what he saw : " It was in the ever-present and overpowering consciousness of the spiritual reality underlying all material phenomena that Carlyle and Hinton resembled each other. . . . Yet even in their insight they were very different ; Hinton surpassing Carlyle as much in the depth and clear- ness of his spiritual vision as he was inferior to him in his individualising faculty, and that firm grasp of men and things which gave Carlyle his power as historian and dramatist. Carlyle did not ' see with the eyes shut ' as well as Hinton, but he saw much better than he with them open" (p. 123). It remains to speak briefly of the two main branches of Hinton's philosophy as they are here presented. The value of this little volume, as the author plainly acknowledges, does not consist in its adding anything to the systematisation or demonstration of Hinton's views. Its value lies in its showing what Hinton's views were, as they appeared to a critical disciple, and so helping others to a more complete ascertainment and estimate of them. Criticism of the views themselves, of Hinton's philosophy as such, would here be entirely out of place. Suffice it to say, on this point, that a certain want of systematisation, a certain lack of coherence, which is observable in Hinton's philosophy as pre- sented by himself, in his various writings, remains equally observ- able in the book before us, and to that extent suggests the antici- cipation that the philosophy may prove ultimately incapable of being thrown into a systematic shape. Two things seem evident about it. First, its Ethic belongs to the Christian line of thought, as opposed to the Eudaemonistic, the line which makes the good and the right consist in the temper and frame of mind of the agent while acting, as opposed to that which makes them consist in results of any kind, near or remote, aimed at or intended by the agent, even including the case where the agent's own moral perfection is the final end. Utilitarianism and Hedonism, both egoistic and altruistic, are special modes of the latter line of thought. Thus we find in the dialogue on Utilitarianism and Altruism the following statement : " The useful thing is what ought to be done no doubt, but not because it has a value in itself, but because of the moral qualities evolved in doing it. I ought to care that my neighbour is fed and clothed, but it is my moral condition, not his material comfort, that is of real importance. The 'uses' must be made the means not the end." (P. 24, and see also pp. 30 and 206.) It is however left in great doubt how this great principle is to be carried out, and in what the criterion of right action is to be placed. How the " law of service," of acting for " others' needs," is either to be applied as a guide to conduct, or to be harmonised with the fundamental principle of acting from a feeling of duty and not for "results," are points which remain wrapped injDro-