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274 CRITICAL NOTICES : pas morale, mais tout ce qui est moral est utile " (p. 192). In other words, the happiness by conducivity to which the morality of actions is to be estimated is one which includes goodness. "II ne faut jamais oublier que le plaisir n'est un bien que dans la liaison avec d'autres biens " (p. 225). I must, however, con- fess to some disappointment at the way in which the principles laid down on pp. 192-3 are worked out in detail. The logical connexion between the author's view of the nature of moral obligation and his view of the moral criterion is not brought out with quite the clearness and cogency which one would have liked to see. The author more and more towards the end of the book seems to lose the moral philosopher in the moralist. Not that he degenerates into mere platitude : many excellent and thought- ful contributions are made to a " theorie des devoirs " ; but the practical sagacity, judgment and moderation of the author's eclecticism are sometimes more conspicuous than the strength of the logical bond which connects together its component elements. After his strong statement of the necessity of a consequential criterion, it is unsatisfactory to be thrown back upon that vaguest of all evasions of the ethical problem " a harmonious develop- ment of all the faculties " : " Or, pour la nature humaine, 1'interet bien entenclu tel que nous 1'avons defini, se resume dans le developpement harmonieux de toutes les i'acultes " (p. 282). It is true that in the next sentence we have a clever exposition of the author's view of the TO? or sovereign good : " II comprend done le bonheur comme la vertu ; mais il ne comprend le bonheur que dans son accord, dans son liurmnnie avec la vertu. La ou cet accord n'existe pas, le malheur de 1'honnete homme ou le bunheur du coupable est contraire a son veritable interet et il appi-llc, pour retablir 1'equilibre, 1'action de la bonne volonte, de la volonte autonome. La ' sanction de la morale ' ne contient pas d'autre mystere." This, with what follows as to the demand of the moral consciousness for an ultimate reconciliation of virtue and happi- ness, is all that could be wished. But surely this is not all that is meant by a " harmonious development of all the faculties " ; and yet, if M. Beaussire means more than this, he does not tell us what that meaning is. But notwithstanding a certain want of mental grip, one could heartily wish that we had in English so good a /v.-//,/,,' of the general principles of a moral philosophy which is Kantian in its formal basis, consequential though not hedonistic in its view of the ethical criterion. It is to be regretted that M. Beaussire should not have had before him Prof. Sidgwick's M<-f //,/.< ,,{ Ethic*. But to M. Beaussire. Mr. Spencer is to him " the most eminent " of the contemporary representatives of Utilitarianism ; and the inconsistency of Mr. Spencer's system with the evolutionary prin- ciples on which it is professedly based, is brought out in some very