Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/283

282 CRITICAL NOTICES : ture of force is the greater. The distinction is in fact only valid if used to indicate that there is a difference in kind between an impulse as moral and impulses not moral, though the intensity of feeling which gathers round the former may be in a case of good action the smaller. And this is the way Butler represented the case, though he did not perceive any of the psychological ques- tions it raised. We may return to Part ii., which treats of the " Forms of Moral Life," that is to say, the institutions in which the Moral Ideas are centred. They form the objective world, the medium in which the moral individual lives. The value of this very inte- resting Part is that it enforces in detail the intelligible character, or what, in spite of the slight flavour of unction in the word, we may call the spiritual character of the ordinary facts of life. This is a way of thinking more or less traditional in Germany, but needing strong enforcement at the present day, when the dis- tinctive features of moral life are in danger of being confused with their natural history. Beginning with the Family or Mar- riage, Prof. Steinthal goes on to take one by one the different elements in the development of society science, art, religion, commerce, and finally the state itself, the rights of citizens and the right of property. The discussion of commerce, though somewhat long, is very instructive. Prof. Steinthal shows that, though commerce rests upon egoism, the desire of self-preservation, it is in fact in the highest sense a moral activity, implying trust and public spirit (pp. 206 ff.). In his view of the state he follows Wilhelm von Humboldt, and is determined by strong antagonism to the popular German idea of a ' Cultur-Staat ' (p. 239), or state which regulates the relations which are usually regarded as the affair of society. It is impossible to get quite a consistent view of the state from Prof. Steinthal : at one time it seems to be a means to a special end, the protection of rights, standing above other unions in the society only on account of its end (p. 235) ; here it is identified with the government. At another time it is declared equivalent to society in general regarded as watching over rights and duties ; here the state, though still including only government and police, is still regarded as the whole society performing a certain function, and differs from the idea of the ' Cultur-Staat ' only in the limits assigned to the functions. The value of Prof. Steinthal's discussion is a practical one, that the state should not convert into legal rights things which are much better left to the free action of individuals, and this needs saying in Germany. We may shortly refer to a number of topics which are treated suggestively and always in a liberal spirit the need of greater freedom of teaching (in Germany) (p. 205), the relation of the schools to religion (p. 203), the right of atheism to be regarded as one form of religion (p. 226), the duty of taking an oath when prescribed by the state (p. 250) Mr. Bradlaugh may have seen Prof. Steinthal's book between this