Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/312

IS THERE ANY SPECIAL ACTIVITY OF ATTENTION? 311 the first class of these we make no resolve, hut, performing an operation, we are occupied with our performance. We are writing or reading, and the subject engrosses us. We, I presume, attend, and we certainly seem active, and the question is, What is such active attention, and does it simply once more consist in interest ? I have no doubt that it does. The subject may predominate because of the activity, but the activity itself is produced by interest. Why am I active ? Because the function of itself is interesting, or because the idea of the result is dominant. The main idea of the subject favours those activities which further its existence, and it lends them its strength. It naturally selects them. Or the idea of an answer to a question which interests creates uneasiness and a coming up and maintenance of any function which serves to relieve. The attention is caused by an in- direct interest, for that produces the activity whose subject predominates. There are some objections which, perhaps, before we go on, should be considered here. It may be said first (a) that no intellectual activity exists, and secondly (b) that the dominant idea could not work. The objections have perhaps not been made in this form, but it will serve to bring out the points of difficulty. (a) If no intellectual activity exists, and if yet there is some activity present in intellectual functions, this activity, it would seem, might be attention. It is not possible for me here to discuss the question of intellectual activities, their existence and their origin, and I prefer to reply, If no activity of intellect then none whatever ; for psychology deals simply with psychical processes. I shall return lower down to this general question, but here will assume that the intellect is active. 1 And if so, its activity upon a certain object will (as was said before) result from interest. The objection how- ever may be pressed as follows. Let that be the case, it may be said, where the intellect does something ; but what where it does nothing and where yet I am active ? In the retention of an image or in the watching of an object I am certainly active ; but where is the intellectual product ? The product appears to be mere attention, and if so, the activity must be attention also. I must meet this objection by attempting to show the nature of retention and of observation. The feel- ing of activity I will deal with hereafter. What is active retention ? The image of a person will not 1 I should say that I decidedly reject the doctrine that active attention consists in comparison. See Lotze, Metaph. 540, Grundzuge d. Psych. 26.