Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/338

THE FINAL AIM OF MORAL ACTION. 337 external power can rob us of it, except by robbing us of consciousness itself. " Our pleasures and pains generally," says Grote in his essay on the philosophy of morals, " are derived from the attainment of various objects foreign to ourselves ; we desire those objects and try to attain them ; our gratification depends upon success. The pleasures and pains of the moral sense, on the other hand, are not derived from the positive attainment of any object foreign to our- selves ; they are derived from reflection on our own conduct in the pursuit of it. The satisfaction of the moral sense is independent of the actual results ; it is not contingent upon success or failure ; no external impediments can disappoint it." In other words, the conviction that one is 'doing right is the single condition for the attainment of the pleasure of the moral sense. It is therefore unconditionally attainable, since any sane man may know whether he thinks he is doing right or not. Accordingly the inner moral sanction would be at least a possible final aim for all men. If any one should affirm the contrary, he would unwittingly remove the very foundation of morals. He would imply that it is a matter of individual temperament or education, whether or not the reflection upon one's own conduct always pleases or pains according as it seems right or wrong. But this is equivalent to denying not only that there is an objective right and wrong, a common standard of action for all men, but that there is even a private standard for each man. In some men, according to this view, there may be no approval of conscience, no pleasure attending the belief that they are doing right, and no self-condemnation at the thought that they are doing wrong. But if there are such men, they simply drop out of our consideration entirely ; they lack the proper moral faculties, and to propose to them any other final moral aim of conduct would betray as much lack of judgment as to propose the inner moral sanction. But perhaps in saying that this would not be a possible end for all men, one would only mean that it would not con- stitute a sure test that their actions were objectively right. And certainly this is true. Various men might attain the approval of conscience by pursuing conflicting lines of con- duct, since the pleasure inevitably attends the conviction that one is doing right, and the conviction itself, like all others, if not submitted to some objective test, is at the mercy of individual whim, temperament and education. But the final aim need not be an objective test of right action ; that it stand the test, whatever that may be, is sufficient. Now to test the relative worth of the inner sanction as compared 23