Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/341

340 s. COIT : It is true that the rule: " Set thy heart neither upon inward peace nor outward success but upon right action itself ; Do right for its own sake," has a tone of sublimity about it. But the reason is that its significance transcends human experi- ence. It suggests the feeling that the moral law is not for the sake of man but for its own sake or that of some un- known being. Its sublimity is therefore not due to the moral exaltation which it awakens but to the sense of mystery. It is a fact worthy of notice also that those philosophers who set up the activity itself as the aim have never done so on the ground that it would conduce most to universal happiness. One might say that Kant had no reasons at all for making it the final aim, since he simply asserts as a primary fact of moral consciousness that a moral will does have absolute worth, and therefore is an end-in-itself. His whole theory, however, of the relation of moral action to the emotions is so defective that his rejection of happiness in any form as the aim of conduct deserves little attention. He thought feeling ought no more to be the impulse than the aim of action. The Stoics also made virtue itself the end of action. But their reasons were quite the opposite of Kant's. They defined virtue as action in accordance with nature. All emotions they regarded as contrary to nature ; therefore, no form of emotion ought ever to be the end of action. But both the premisses of this syllogism are arbitrary. Is it an intuition of reason that what is contrary to nature ought not to be aimed at ? The Christian consciousness would not assent to such a statement. And is it a fact of experience that emotions are contrary to nature? Surely, under any of the numerous definitions which one might take, it would seem that nothing is more natural than emotion. The subjective turn of thought which the inner moral sanction as aim would induce distinguishes it radically from right activity as the aim of conduct. And as in the former point of difference, here too we find the inner sanction to be the more conducive to universal happiness. It is sometimes argued that a subjective turn of thought takes the zest out of pleasure. But to this it may be answered that there could be no greater blessing to mankind than that certain pleasures should have much of their zest taken out of them ; they are too keen, they tempt men to injustice and intemperance. And these are exactly the pleasures which moral introspec- tion would damage. But it must be admitted also that certain pains would be intensified by self-examination. It would sharpen the tooth of a gnawing conscience. And yet