Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/349

348 s. COIT : done for their own sake which aw r aken such lofty admiration are not the class w r hich through habit are done for their own sake. But such deeds, while in themselves not more virtuous, are better signs of the settled disposition of the doer, and thus justify the preference given them by men in general. And yet, as we see, here also the popular sentiment cannot be brought against the inner sanction as final aim. But there is still another ground for the popular senti- ment. Since the original impulse to do right precedes the knowledge of the pleasure, only the act which springs out of this impulse would deserve to be called in the highest sense virtuous. But it is human nature itself which, measured according to this standard of virtue, is found wanting ; and this weakness in human nature is really a reason for, instead of against, the inner sanction as end of action. This aim may perhaps still be objected to on the ground that it would not be an entirely disinterested aim. But from the point of view of universal happiness it makes no differ- ence whether it be purely disinterested or not. As Bishop Butler says : " "We may judge and determine that an action is morally good or evil before we so much as consider whether it be interested or disinterested ". The only ques- tion is whether ,an act or an aim increase the universal sum of happiness more than any other act or aim would. Kant, as we have seen, by no means proved that absolute dis- interestedness is essential to rightness of motive, but only that no other reward should be sought than the satisfaction of beholding the good will in ourselves. Now in this relative sense it may be said that the good will is disinterested. This use of the word would be justified by analogy. The artist who seeks no other reward than the delight in creating a thing of beauty is said to be disinterested in his art. Although his motive is not benevolence, still it is also not self-love. It is the love of delight in beauty, and this desire can be traced back only to the love of beauty itself as an original impulse in the nature of the artist. Likewise when a man seeks the peace of conscience, his motive is the love of delight in goodness, which springs not out of love of self but out of an original natural impulse, however impotent, to do right. Furthermore, deeds, in this relative sense dis- interested, may be said also to be " done for their own sake," since the attendant pleasure is an immanent effect of the activity. This is the sense in which Hume would use the words " done for their own sake ". At the close of his Essay " Concerning Moral Sentiment " he speaks of virtue as "an end," as " desirable on its own account, without fee or reward,