Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/375

374 D. G. EITCHIE I Thus the visions of a future life at the end of the Republic and of the Phaedo lead to the practical lesson of the immense importance of knowledge and conduct in this. Life is thus regarded, not as a time of probation to determine once for all the eternal destiny of man, but as a time of education to prepare him for the life or lives to come an idea which has nowhere been so forcibly impressed in modern times as in some of Browning's poems (e.g., "Apparent Failure," "Evelyn Hope," "Christina": not so distinctly in the argumentative "La Saisiaz," where the conception of pro- bation is made use of, though not in the ordinary dogmatic way). in. In what sense does Plato hold immortality? What part of the soul is immortal ? To these questions it is not easy to find a consistent or uniform answer in Plato's dialogues. In the Phaedrus the soul is imaged as a charioteer driving two horses. This image we may fairly interpret in accord- ance with the psychology of the Republic as representing the three elements of Reason, Spirit (TO Ovfj-oeioes] and Desire. All these elements, then, are in the Phaedrus spoken of as belonging to the immortal soul and as existing apart from the body. In the Timaeus the different parts of the soul are localised in different parts of the body. In the Republic (ix. 588) we have the soul described as a complex creature man, lion, hydra, all enclosed in the form of a man. [Can this be taken as a recognition that the Reason or highest element is the true -self? as Aristotle says : So^eiev av TO voovv eWcrro? elvai (Eth. Nic. ix. 4, 4) or does it only mean that every indi- vidual man, apparently one, is really complex?] In Rqi. 611 C, D, the true and immortal soul is said to be ordinarily crusted over and concealed by impurities. And so in the Phaedo the soul of the philosopher is spoken of as free from passion and desire. Again, Plato seems to waver between the view of the Phaedrus and Republic, that the soul of the good man is that in which the lower elements are under con- trol, and the more ascetic view of the Phaedo, that the good man is free from passions and desires altogether. Of course it is obvious that all turns on what is meant by desire. Plato often tends to regard desire as an altogether irrational element, though he sometimes sees that Reason in order to act necessarily implies desire (or at least the element of 0u/j,6<> or impulse). In the Phaedo the desires are indeed dis- tinctly ascribed to the body, whereas in the Philebus (35 C)