Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/421

420 CRITICAL NOTICES : Schopenhauer, whom he regards as the two greatest of all philo- sophers. The division into "Theory of Knowledge," "Physics," " ^Esthetics," "Ethics," "Politics" and "Metaphysics" is carried through both parts of this volume. The Ew.ys that make up the second volume are arranged under two principal heads " Eealism and Idealism" (i.-vii.) and "Socialism" (viii.-x.). In the essays of the first group the relation of the author's system to Brahnian- ism, Buddhism and Christianity the three pessimistic religions is explained. The second group is followed by two essays entitled "Gleanings" (xi.) and "Critique of Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious " (xii.). This last essay fills the whole of the fifth published Part of the volume. Its aim is to show that Hartmann is in error in returning to a pantheism that makes the whole world " a real unity " ; the true direction of thought being to develop further Schopenhauer's doctrine of the iii<l!i-i<lnnl will as thing-in-itself, which requires that the world should be regarded as only "a collective unity," no longer as the manifestation of a single will or spirit. The later portions of Mainlander's work show no falling off, but on the contrary an increase in power. And, as might be expected, he finds it possible in a series of essays to say many things that could not be got within the more rigid framework of a systematic treatise. Following the Essays there was to have appeared an Autobiography ; but instead of this there is now promised (as mentioned in the last number of MIND) a memoir of the author, by his sister, who has superintended the publication of the whole of the second volume. Those who have read any portion of his work will look forward with interest to the appearance of the promised Leb<:nJci::::i', for Mainlander is one of the writers who awaken the desire to know something more of their personality than can be gathered from their books alone. Prof. Wundt, indeed, in his brief reference to Tin' Pliilu.tnjili>j of Rt'<l>-ini>fif>n in MIND, Vol. ii. 510, seems to be of opinion that its interest is entirely that of an expression of personality ; classing it among pessimistic speculations that are " guided more by feeling and temperament than by scientific method ". This remark perhaps has reference to the absence of any elaborate attempt to balance pleasures and pains or to deduce the pessi- mistic conclusion from the negative character of pleasure. It may be contended, however, that this is an evidence of the author's profoundly philosophical conception of the question as to the worth of life. While Schopenhauer and Hartmann proceed by indirect methods, deductive or inductive, Mainliinder puts the question directly as one that is to be solved by subjective reflec- tion. Having arrived at his own conclusion, he appeals for con- firmation to the philosophies of India. What was the result, he asks, when for the first time a philosophically trained class was able to escape from the struggle for existence and to gain complete leisure for contemplation '? The result was necessarily the pessimism of the Brahmans. Now this is a powerful his-