Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/431

430 CEITICAL NOTICES : J. W. NAHLOWSKY, ETC. conflict can be surmounted in two opposite ways which are not morally indifferent. If the wills A and B are both fixed on an object X, which can only satisfy one of them, it is of little impor- tance to say that the conflict between A and B is immedi- ately displeasing or morally wrong. It might well be maintained that not the conflict as such is displeasing, but the action of A or of B or,, in some cases, of both in contending for the object. At any rate, the important question for morals is, How is the wrong to be righted ? What rules can be given for determining whether A or B ought to submit, and where mutual concessions are required? The imperative "Thou shalt not strive " requires many modifica- tions before it can be accepted as ethically valid. It may be a small matter that it opposes the tradition which " approves all forms of competition " ; but it has also to take account of the elements in the moral ideal recognised by the ordinary conscious- ness which are often only to be attained or retained by means of conflict. Nahlowsky's classification of the "fundamental cases " of con- flict does not seem to exhaust the logical or actual alternatives : but it is not necessary here to go beyond the alternatives he deals with. In discussing his first " fundamental case " that in which the object of strife is necessary to the physical existence or moral ideal of one of the contending parties his analysis of Eight falls back upon the notion of Freedom. " An individual," it is said, " is obliged to limit the external use of his freedom so as to admit of others following out their ends as persons." But the Freedom here implied is something different from that which forms the first Idea. And the richer notion of Personality is introduced to give at once content to the conflicting wills, and a solution of the conflict. Here, however, it would seem to be not the conflict which displeases, but the violation of another personality. The notion on which all morality hinges is, therefore, just this notion of per- sonality : a notion which more than any other is in need of meta- physical and historical explanation. Yet such explanation is disallowed in this connexion by the author's fundamental position as to the independence of ethical science. Other cases of conflict can hardly be said to be so treated by the author as to show the application of the moral Idea of Eight to the complex region of disputed claims to things and services. Nahlowsky's Idea of Eight is a typical order of individuals of such a kind that strife between them shall permanently cease. But this ideal is only attainable, and is only intelligible, by means of rules whsraby to estimate competing claims and thus give a prin- ciple for deciding conflicts. W. E. SORLEY.