Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/459

458 A. BAIN : which must be at best provisional at the outset. Mr. Ward, in his first section, " The Standpoint of Psychology," pro- ceeds by remarking first on the contrast of Internal and External, which is fallacious from the failure of space-rela- tions in speaking of the mind as compared with the body. This he indicates as clearly as could be done, without an- ticipating a difficult problem. The second contrast Mental and Material he also disposes of with equal justice. He does not, for some reason, avail himself of an enumeration of physical properties Extension, Resistance, and so on to lead up to the ambiguous borderland of matter and mind; but he allows us to feel at once that the transcendental ques- tion of an external world must be reckoned with, if not satisfactorily disposed of, in order to make this contrast the basis of a definition. His own definition turns upon the word ' individualistic ' ; which is not to define by subject- matter, but by the standpoint for viewing our experience. His real definition for expository purposes consists in enu- merating the ultimate constituents of mind, very much as is done by everybody in the present day. Leaving the definition, we are invited to discuss the "General Analysis of Mind; its Ultimate Constituents. There cannot be less than three, as in the propositions I feel somehow, I know something, I do something. But now who is 'I'. Must there not be an entity distinct from feeling, knowing and doing, and having a common relation to all the three ? On this point Mr. Ward is very decided. Everything mental must be referred to a Self; something of the nature of the pure Ego of Kant, which he opposed to the empirical Ego. Previous attempts to extri< the subject are severely criticised in their order. The nature of such criticism will be appreciated if we take up the first of them. According to Hume, the mind or soul is simply " the name for the series of mental phenomena which make up an indi- vidual mind". But as we undoubtedly are self-conscious beings, that is, are aware of what happens to us as recipients of impressions, and affected in various ways, how can a series be aware of itself? Agent and patient are never to- gether in the same act. Knowing and known must be different. As to " a series of states being aware of itself," I confess I see no insurmountable difficulty. It may be a fact, or not a fact ; it may be a very clumsy expression for what it is applied to ; but it is neither paradox nor self-contradiction. A "series" merely contradicts an individual, or it may be