Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/462

MR. JAMES WARD'S " PSYCHOLOGY ". 461 tion of the other. The second is a matter of hypothesis, which is, that the distinctness of the separate members of our mental trains grew out of a process of differentiation from a primitive homogeneous current. Now it is obvious that our language must provide for both the separateness and the unity or continuity of the stream of thought. Yet my fear is that " continuum " rather inclines us too much to the other extreme. Moreover, I am not aware of any erroneous tendencies due to the previous phraseology ; at all events, I think it could be used without implying any dangerous amount of independence among the terms of mental succession. A train of impressions, presen- tations, ideas, may have any amount of coherence and dependence, that we may choose to assign ; while the word does not sink the circumstance of plurality. That the suc- cessive members of a train should be regarded as parts of one whole, is not only unnecessary but misleading. The idea of part and whole is extended beyond ordinary usage ; in the same way that ' redintegration ' expresses too much as a name for reproduction by means of association. Except as a variety of expression suitable on occasions when the continuity of a series of states has to be emphatically set forth, I am not convinced of the need for this innovation. The hypothesis of differentiation will come up again. Before finishing his survey of fundamentals, Mr. Ward discusses particularly the motor presentations or movements ; and connects with the discussion the germs or beginnings of Conation or Action. We are here at once in the very heart of abstruse psychological theory. It is better for us, however, in our review, to pass on till the handling of the will is given in all its completeness. We shall therefore consider that the fundamentals have been given, and proceed to the detailed and systematic working out. The commencing topic is " Theory of Presentations," and this is followed by related matters under the head of Cognition, as Sensation and Movement, Perception, Idea- tion or Imagination, Association. Feeling is in abeyance throughout. The starting-point is Differentiation from a primary homo- geneous continuum. " Psychologists have usually represented mental advance as consisting fundamentally in the combina- tion and re-combination of various elementary units, the so-called sensations and primitive movements, or, in other words, in a species of mental chemistry." Not altogether without reason, as it seems to me. Our education from first to last takes principally the form of adding unit to unit,