Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/471

470 A. BAIN : occurrence of images. They correspond to local signs in extended objects. We shall hear more of them afterwards. Such being the " Memory-continuum," the next step is to form out of it an ideational continuum, or rather many such. The meaning is that the literality of the memory-train is broken in upon, except in idiots, by the collision of different trains, during which some parts are strengthened and others left to die out for want of the nourishment that renewal gives. Through this joint effect of obliviscence and redu- plication we are provided with a flow (or many flows) of ideas distinct from the memory-train, and more or less suited for our intellectual and volitional manipulation. The author then touches upon the interference due to conflict of presentations and mental currents ; objecting to the title ' obstructive association,' but admitting the fact. He next considers the moot point of drawing the line be- tween Memory and Imagination, and is I think correct in assigning as the two characteristics of memory proper (1) concreteness or circumstantiality, and (2) localisation in the past, the last being the more essential. The representa- tion of one's past self as agent or patient is also a concurring circumstance, but not essential. From memory he proceeds to Expectation, as the natural sequel. After a series of events has been once experienced, we instinctively anticipate its recurrence, provided the memory-train is intact. At this point, however, the author widens the inquiry into an examination of the distinction of present, past and future. The present is the real or actual, and is determined by our primary presentations, as already seen. But we do not know the present as present until it is put side by side with both memories and expectations. An event expected has an interest altogether its own, and puts us into a more active attitude in consequence. The words ' expect,' ' await,' ' anticipate,' all point to an attitude of mind, wholly different from the attitude towards present or past. To know" a present, as present, we must have, in the consciousness along with it, both memories and expecta- tions, which are of course in the form of ideas or representa- tions. The difference between memory and expectation is, as already said, a difference of attitude and interest : both are distinguishable from the present as being ideal. With a fixed series of events, ABODE, we know where we are by one being in full actuality, as C, while AB and DE are in ideality ; and we know that AB are behind, when in moving on to D, the ideas of AB are fading, and the idea of E rising in intensity, while also engaging the expectation-attitude.