Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/557

556 H. EASHDALL : activities of Season is not defined, is conceived of as intellectual, or (according to the phraseology of the time) "an intellectual faculty ". In the first place Butler's habitual synomym for it is a "principle of Reflection" ; sometimes he speaks of it as a " par- ticular kind of Reflection," or simply " Reflection ".. Once at least he boldly identifies it with Reason, or rather includes it in Reason. " As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength, various subordinations, under one direction, that of the supreme authority .... so reason, several appetites, passions and affections, prevailing in different degrees of strength, is not tit at idea or notion of human nature, but that nature consists in these several principles considered as having a natural respect to each other, in the several passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of reflection or conscience " (Sermon iii.). It is clear that in " reason, several appetites, passions and affec- tions " we are presented with an exhaustive classification of the " parts " or " members " of the Butlerian "system or constitution" of human nature. Conscience is clearly distinguished from " appetites, passions and affections " ; hence it must be included in " Reason ". So again in Sermon xii. : " As the form of the body is a composition of various parts, so likewise our imvard structure is not simple or uniform, but a composition of various passions, appetites, affections, together with rationality, including in this last both the discernment of what is right and disposition to regulate ourselves by it ". It is, however, only to the first of these elements, or "Rationality," that Butler gives the name of Con- science, as he expressly declares in Sermon i. : " This principle in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and action is conscience ; for this is the strict sense of the word, though sometimes it is used to take in more ". Butler is a writ-jr in whom a very little ingenuity may discover apparent incon- sistencies ; but I do not believe that it will be possible to quote a sentence from any part of the Sennons, or the Preface to them, really inconsistent with this explicit declaration. It may, however, be urged that the exact words which Butler uses in defining his " Conscience " are of less importance than the general drift and method of his whole system ; and with this I should quite agree. And to my mind the main reason why Mr. Courtney has found so much difficulty in forming a clear concep- tion of the mutual relations of the various " principles " of Butler's "human nature" is that he does not perceive that substantially the self-evident authority which Butler claims for " Conscience " is the authority of Reason. Perhaps the best way of bringing out the rational character of Butler's " Conscience " though to the present writer it reveals itself in nearly every page of the Sermons is to point out the relation between " Self-love " and Conscience as conceived by Butler. It is assumed through- out that the authority of " Self-love " and " Conscience " is in a sense the same in kind. To Mr. Courtney this doctrine is a stumbling-block ; but, properly understood, it expresses the fact