Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/564

THE DEFINITION OF NATURAL LAW. By NOEMAN PEAKSON. Under existing circumstances an attempt to criticise the ac- cepted definition of Natural Law is a somewhat venturesome undertaking. There is perhaps no single term which is at once so rigidly defined by the learned and so consistently miscon- ceived by the ignorant. It has often been pointed out, and with perfect justice, that for a great deal of this confusion scientific men have nobody but themselves to blame. The term " Law " was most unfortunately selected by science to denote something which has hardly a feature in common with law in its ordinary meaning. In consequence of this latent ambiguity the scientific conception of Natural Law has had, and probably for a long time will have, to struggle with a mass of popular misconcep- tions, in addition to certain more legitimate criticisms. It is extremely hard to persuade people new to the subject that "Natural Law" in the scientific sense involves no notion of an over-ruling ordinance ; and it is perfectly easy to appreciate the difficulty which such people feel. It is obviously unnecessary, however, to discuss this distinction for the benefit of my present readers, and I only propose here to suggest a special modification of the definition of Natural Law which I think in honesty the facts of the case require. The definitions of Natural Law given by scientific writers are all substantially identical, and I only quote from two of the best- known in order to illustrate the point which I wish to enforce. Lewes (Problems of Life and Mind, p. 308) describes a law of nature (in the sense now under discussion) as " a notation of the process observed in phenomena ". Again, " a law is simply the notation of observed facts ". So too Mill (Three Essays on Relif/ion, p. 14) says that laws of nature " are neither more nor less than observed uniformities in the occurrence of phenomena". (The italics in the above quotations are mine.) Other writers speak of them as generalisations from experience ; and, in short, the notion, of previous observation or ascertainment enters invariably into the scientific definition of Natural Law. But it is in this respect that I think all such definitions are faultily severe. It is obvious, of course, that Ascertainment is a necessary pre-requisite to the classification of natural laws. We cannot pronounce upon the uniformity of a natural process until such uniformity has been observed : in other words, we cannot know a natural law till we do know it. But though this proposition is indisputably true, it is nevertheless indisputably barren ; and it is surely needless to encumber a scientific definition with the paste-board armour of an empty truism.