Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/570

THE DEFINITION OF NATURAL LAW. 569 to preserve both the uniformity of nature and the miraculous character of the so-called miracle. The phrase, however, is extremely misleading, and in this connexion is almost meaning- less. If an invariable order of nature exists at all, there can be no degrees of validity between its processes. All alike are invariably orderly, the simplest being just as stubborn in its regularity as the most abstruse. The theory of a " higher " law only derives what plausibility it possesses from an importation into the mean- ing of "Natural law" of the illegitimate sense of "ordinance". It is possible to imagine degrees of validity or authority between different ordinances or spells ; it is quite impossible to imagine any such degrees between the various manifestations of Natural order. Moreover, even if the doctrine of a higher law were admissible, it would not save the miracle, qud miracle. For, inasmuch as the miracle is still ex hypothesi referred to Natural Law, i.e., is regarded as a link in some natural chain of causation, it is still a natural and not a miraculous phenomenon, and conse- quently its evidential value as a miracle is absolutely nil. But this doctrine of "higher laws," erroneous though it be, does throw some useful light on that class of phenomena to which I have already referred, and which are apt to be excluded from acceptance by the strict definition of Natural Law. We cannot properly admit any variance of validity between laws of nature, . any more than we can admit that such laws are occasionally irregular. But, on the other hand, we can hardly help admitting the possibility at any rate of orderly phenomena as yet unknown to us. Phenomena of this kind may have escaped observation, either by reason of the limitation of our own faculties, or because their antecedents are complex and therefore comparatively rare, or from a combination of both these reasons. Consequently the strangeness of a phenomenon does not justify us in pronouncing it either a delusion or a miracle, for its unusual character may well be referred to a combination of unusual but perfectly orderly conditions. If this be so, the case against the ascertainment-clause is made out. If we believe Natural Law to prevail universally, it is incorrect to define it as an order which is limited limited, that is, by the condition of previous observation. If, on the other hand, we desire to restrict its meaning to observed uniformities of process, it is inaccurate to call it Natural Law ; seeing that, ex hypothesi, it does not extend to the ichole of nature, but only to- that small part of it which has fallen under human observation. 38