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NEW BOOKS. 589 brevity and precision, (3) to track all the more important notions along the course of the history of philosophy. What strikes one most in the execution is the inclusion of so many words of merely popular interest, to the exclusion of not a few ' words of art ' for which the philosophical student will look in vain : thus, though there is an article Beispiel giving Exemplum as synomym, Exemplum gets no mention in its place (where it would be looked for) nor does the original Paradeigma appear to get any mention at all. Paradeigma suggests the parallel Enthymema to the Aris- totelian student, and here one is surprised, among many (? too many) mean- ings assigned, to find no reference to Aristotle's original meaning of the w< n-(l. In another vein, Association cannot be said to be very adequately touched on the historical side when we are only told that " already Plato and Aristotle speak of it, but first the later psychology, especially Herbart (1776-1841), has investigated it thoroughly . Of Hartley, Hume and all the English, not a word ! Yet there are many interesting things brought together in these pages. The author should gird himself to a very strenu- ous revision and recasting in that second edition to which he looks for reparation of shortcomings. Das Problem der GewissheiL Grundztige einer Erkenntnisstheorie. Von Dr. FRANZ GRUNG. Heidelberg : G. Weiss, 1886. Pp. 205. This work on the theory of certitude, which is to appear shortly in Norwegian, the author's native language, as well as in German, is divided as follows: i. "Certitude" (pp. 1-29); ii. "Historical Survey of the doctrine of Certitude," from antiquity to the most recent times (pp. 30- 100) ; iii. " The Elements of Certitude," including certitude of (1) percep- tion, (2) thought, (3) memory (pp. 100-153) ; iv. " The Forms of Develop- ment of Certitude," including (1) " immediate," (2) " scientific," (3) " per- sonal" certitude (pp. 154-184) ; v. "The Criterion of Certitude" (pp. 185- 205). The author finds that certitude is always " a combination of will and reason ". The power of the will in relation to the activity of thought is, however, entirely negative ; it cannot create, it can only hinder. This negative influence of the will does not proceed from " a single arbitrary decision," but from " will in the immediate feeling of its interest ". Since will cannot be directly controlled by knowledge, but only by another act of will, the question becomes, "What direction ought to be impressed on the voluntary activity in order that truth may be attained 1 " The answer is that the will must be cleared of all special interests and directed only by a sense of the interests of mankind as a whole. There is no general criterion of truth, for " our knowledge may always be an illusion," but only of " certitude ". The criterion of certitude is the absence of self-con- tradiction. The logical laws are the test of "the form of certitude" ; the test of its content is experience. How then shall we resolve the conflicts that have arisen, in the philosophical schools, between experience and logic 1 In this way : the criterion must be finally fixed as " absence of contradiction of given experiences". To the "centrifugal tendency" that carries the mind beyond the limits of the special experiences in question at the time into the realm of general presuppositions, of "concepts," is to be opposed the " centripetal tendency " constituted by the mind's feeling of its limitation. There may remain " contradictory concepts," and certitude is not destroyed ; but there must be no " contradictory experiences ". Modtrne Versuche eines Religionsersatzes. Ein philosophischer Essay von Dr. H. DRUSKOWITZ. Heidelberg : G. Weiss, 1886. Pp. 90. This is a critical exposition of some modern attempts to find a " substitute for religion " which shall be to the mass of mankind what the historical