Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/599

598 NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE. Mill therefore never undertook to prove that others' happiness should be sought, for he simply said, " Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof". He confined himself to the proof that happiness "some- where or other " is the only thing that can be desired, and this he could only prove negatively, just as he might be able to prove sound to be the only thing audible. The second assumption remains, ami to Mill quite consciously, " not amenable to direct proof," a mere desire of his ovn which he hopes by some means to make a universal desire. His theory is therefore complete. Xo conception of a moral end has been framed without the implication of happiness. He has not himself framed one without that implication. He therefore believes that we cannot conceive any actions taking place otherwise than towards happii Assured therefore that no one can consciously aim at anything but happi- ness somewhere or other, his task is to instil the desire of happiness of others, but he declines the task of pmciny this. There is certainly here a possible gap, if only it can befitted: to prove to me, an egoist, that I ought to seek others' happiness. How does Prof. Sidgwick fill the supposed gap { Prof. Sidgwick seems to be, as stated above, very much in the same position as Mill in regard to the question of happiness being the ultimate aim ; but the other part of the question he solves by finding the self- evident principle mentioned above. But whence does this principle in reality derive its self-evidence ? It is simply from the fact that it is an analytic and not a synthetic proposition. The word " right " in itself connotes a regard for other people. Prof. Sidgwick certainly would evade this, if possible, by declaring that we do not regard with indifference a man who neglects his own happiness simply because he does not care for happiness ; but it is only necessary here to remember that no action, or forbearance to act, on my part, is indifferent to others. My happiness always affects that of my children and that of those who are around me. Nothing that Prof. Sidgwick has said of objective right will obviate the necessary implication of regard for others (even though it might eliminate regard for their praise or blame of myself) in my notion of right ; he has himself given up the task of proving to any one that he ought to do some- thing objectively right. " I at least (says he) do not know how to impart the notion of moral obligation to any one who is entirely devoid of it," and he has only proved happiness to be the ultimate good with as much cogency as Mill himself. That there has been any gap filled up therefore cannot be maintained. Both seem to be at one in fact and only dilferent in name. But perhaps a difference lies in this, that to Mill " desirable," though not including all that is desired, connotes a desire in some one. The "ought" passes out from some one who lias conceived a desire (the possibility of advance in this desire covering all that Prof. Sidgwick has been able to bring forward on "objective right"). Mill's one resource therefore to prove a moral end is to instil a desire for it in any possible way. Prof. Sidgwick simply says that every man ought to know that there is something which ought to be done and that part of this somethi:. self-evident. Certainly it is evident enough that if I "ought" to do anything I "ought" to respect the claims of others ; but the question is. Is it srl ('-evident that. I "ought" to do anything'^ Prof. Sidgwick says it is self-evident self- evident to him ; but this simply means that lie desires the claims of others to be respected by each. The "ought" corresponds to a desire of his. Just what Mill had said. If then the Intuitionists are willing to accept this reconciliation (with the proviso always that it may some day be possible to frame a conception of a moral end without happiness, j ust as possible as it may be to frame a