Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/81

70 H. M. STANLEY : Prof, James's theory (MiND XXXIV. 188) is that expressions, instead of being determined by the emotions, determine them. We do not strike because ve are angry, but we are angry because we strike. This involves the general theory that body not mind is determining factor ; that emotions, &c., are merely subjective side of objective changes. The opposite theory is that the ex- pressions, neural changes, &c., are but objective side of subjective changes, e.g,, of emotions. From the point of view of conscious- ness we speak of expressing our emotions, but from the real point of view, according to Prof. James's theory, we should speak of emotions being expressions in consciousness of our bodily activi- ties. This is a thorough and logical carrying out of the physio- logical point of view, which should emphasise not only nerve- states as objective support of conscious states, but also muscular and organic states. Mind as series of subjective changes finds its objective support in body as a whole, and not in nerves merely. To consider this general attitude of thought would call for too ex- tended discussion. It is sufficiently evident that, approaching from the objective physiological side, this treatment of emotion as concomitant and resultant of not only neural but general bodily activities, known from the psychological point of view as ex- pression, is inevitable. Let us notice this position, however, from the point of view of consciousness. Prof. James points to the fact that exercising the expres- sions or imagining the feeling calls up the feeling, as a proof of his theory. This, however, is merely a matter of association, and can prove neither a real precedent nor resultant. We may call up ideation as well as emotion by producing associated activities. In the interdependence of the conscious life, emotion, perception and willing call up each other without reference to causative order. Any one element of consciousness may be regarded either as resultant or stimulant according as we look at preceding or following state of consciousness. In the order of evolution, pain and pleasure arise from certain actions to inhibit or stimulate repetition of actions. Feeling is then both resultant and stimulant. The emotions may arise from the expressions J>y association, but the original dependence is that of expression on emotion. The further test, that we cannot imagine an emotion without bringing in bodily presentation, is simply a necessity of imagination as such, and due to association and organisation. In common language emotion is made precedent to expression, and this is the psychological standpoint. We speak continually of venting anger, giving expression to feeling, giving way to our emotions, &c. The will repre- u-esses or impresses emo- tions. When the bodily expression is not allowed there is rankling, when repressed thoughtfully and measurably there is repression, of emotion ; when expression is allowed in measure there is relief, when expression is uncontrollable there is exhaus- tion ; when an emotion is desired, the will by repeating known