Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/87

76 c. BEAD : It has been urged that pleasure and pain make up feeling as feeling. The first differentiation of Pain is through cognition of object painful. This state is Fear. Difference in intensity is developed very early, so we have Terror and Fear proper. Cog- nition of time soon differentiates under immediate form as Alarm and under more distant form as Dread. Far later Horror as altruistic form of terror will arise. We merely give this as an approximate illustration of the correct form and method of evolutionary classification. The development of mind as a whole must be followed. Pleasures and Pains would appear as the two great correlated classes into which the emotions vould divide, and each would in interdependence be differentiated by the forms of cognition and volition as these severally arise. MR. MERCIER'S CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS. By CARVETH BEAD. A plan of classifying the Emotions, or rathe.r of providing a substitute for such a classification, had occupied me for some time, when there appeared in MIND a series of remarkable and in many ways admirable articles on the Classification of Feelings by Mr. Mercier : articles of such excellence that it would have been absurd to proceed with what I had to say without some examina- tion of them. And whilst the publication of my own notions is still unavoidably postponed, it seems best to print at once the following conti'oversial matter. Mr. Mercier begins by professing a general adherence to Mr. Spencer's psychology, and to the principle of Evolution ; but, finding some fault with that philo- sopher's classification of Feelings, he proposes to set forth another more in accordance with the rest of the system. The objections he raises against Mr. Spencer's doctrine as expounded in P*;/<-//t>[i>>/>/, j. 480, must be allowed, I think, to have some foundation in the text. He shows that the same feeling, Terror, may be classed as Presentative-representative, Representative, or Ke-representative ; and that feelings so different as Blue and Triumph seem to be sometimes included in one class (Mixn XXXV. 326-8). Confining attention to 480, these objections seem pertinent ; but this leads me to make three remarks. First, Mr. Spencer in classifying feelings has not resorted to as much abstraction as he might legitimately have done, but has rather dealt with total states of consciousness. Thus Terror at sight of a snake, Terror at thought of a snake, and Terror without definite occasion on going into the dark, seem, as Mr. Mercier points out, to be placed in three different classes. But surely the element of Terror is the same in all these cases; and, as to the ancient essential body of it, is in each case of the same degree