Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/89

78 c. BEAD : an error in Mr. Mercier's first principle, which will explain most of the shortcomings in his classification. " Feeling," he says (p. 331), " is the correspondence of states in the organism with interactions between the organism and the environment." Feeling then " must vary as this interaction varies, and it must be possible to obtain a classification of feelings from a classification of the actions". Now, w r aiving other remarks that might be made upon this statement, we must observe that it omits a most im- portant qualification. It should be enlarged as follows (to begin with his own words): "It must be possible to obtain a classification of feelings from a classification of the interactions " in iiU ///>'// di'iji'i'i'x of c.i:/<'//x/on i/i x/iiirf ami fini' 1 , art'? in all f/f/'r possible coi/tli/Hi/fio//* .</'>/ uf, iji>ii/>rid a//// cnniplex. Whoever refers to Mr. Mercier's classificatory Tables may judge how far they realise such a principle as this. From them we might suppose that the forces of the environment only approach the organism in single file ; that the organism deals with the environment by a series of uncoordinated movements ; and that our feelings, just as distinct and structurally on a level, pair off with these inter- actions. But surely the conduct of life is not so easy, and we are not so simple-minded. Taking the above principle as amended, observe its impracti- cability. All the interactions of organism and environment, in all degrees of remoteness and combination, would be hard to classify in any detail ; and if they were so classified we could not pre- sume that corresponding with every member of the classification there would be recognisable a variety of feeling. Accordingly, whilst keeping in view (as Mr. Spencer has done) the objective reference of feeling, the basis of any treatment of the feelings (whether a classification or some substitute for one) must be subjective. We must begin with the feelings as given by intro- spection ; and, having made a first distribution of them according to their apparent agreements and differences, we must let them guide us to the circumstances of their origin and growth ; whence we may learn further and better particulars to correct our first impressions. Of this work a good deal has been done already, partly as usual by common sense, partly by scientists. We have not to build a new house on a sand-patch of our own reclaiming, but to lend a hand to the workmen upon a public edifice. If the application of Mr. Mercier's principle according to its complete statement is impracticable, what are the resultsof working it out in the imperfect form which it has in his articles? Let me begin by drawing attention to some improvements that might perhaps be made in his classification without regard to its prin- ciple. And, first, some alterations seem desirable in naming the feelings themselves. Feelings that are excited by interactions differing only in degree of energy, whilst similar in kind and in circumstances, usually themselves differ only in degree, and should be designated accordingly. Thus in Table iii. (p. 345)