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C. BENOUVIEK, DES DOCTRINES PHILOSOPHIQUES. 109 interests. All beliefs are of course subject to the tests of verifi- cation and of consistency. Beliefs that cannot bear these tests must disappear sooner or later, whether we wish it or not. M. Benouvier does not deny this ; but to anyone who should insis f that for these reasons "evidence" is more profound than "belief," he would reply that there is more in the great philosophical systems than can be completely submitted to either test. The pantheistic doctrine which is the final outcome of the set of posi- tions opposed to his own is, he admits, as consistent with itself as the doctrine of the practical reason. To the positivist or agnostic objection that there is no need to choose between oppos- ing systems of metaphysics at all, he replies that not to choose would be to take custom instead of reason for the guide of life ; but that those who use this argument have really made their choice, and that they imagine themselves to have " evidence " sufficient for the refutation of the view they practically reject. ., To the belief at which M. Eenouvier arrives on the ground of the Kantian postulates, it may be objected, from the practical point of view, that the construction is too " problematical " to have any real influence 011 conduct. The objection he himself makes to Pascal's argument might also be brought against it. This type of theism, it might be said, is after all only the ghost of a particular historical religion, not really, as is contended, " quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus ". Its special affi- nities are seen by M. Eenouvier's regarding as possible an alliance between " the Criticist philosophy of consciousness " and a Chris- tianity cleared of the dogmas of "absolutist" and " infinitist " theologians. A religious creed going beyond the " necessary and sufficient " postulates of the practical reason, he allows to be legitimate in its own sphere. Although it may not be confounded with philosophy, it may be held as a kind of " philosophic faith ". But, not to pursue these considerations of detail, there is a fundamental objection to the whole method of " the practical reason ". M. Eenouvier, it must be remembered, contends for an element of active desire in the affirmations of both the great philosophic parties. In the case of the party opposed to his own, he often speaks of this desire as having its motive in intellectual as distin- guished from practical interests. Yet, rather strangely, he never definitely asks whether the desire that expresses itself here may not be that by which exclusively we ought to be influenced in the decision of the last questions of metaphysics as of the first ques- tions suggested by scientific curiosity. He never seems to con- ceive it to be possible that anyone who has seen that there is active choice of belief should still maintain the primacy in meta- physics of the theoretical reason ; should regard the introduction of ethical considerations at the point where the highest speculative questions are reached as being just as irrelevant as it would be in physical science. The exact omission that is made is seen most