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J. VOLKELT, ERFAHRUNG- UND DENKEN. 123 sense in which they are used by him. In laying the foundations of a theory of knowledge everything depends on the power of de- nning terms so as take account of the innumerable side-issues as well as main problems that have come to be connected with them. Here, as elsewhere in philosophy, the settlement of the signifi- cance of a term is the final result of prolonged analysis. In the course of Prof. VolkehVs work, many questions of logical theory or of the philosophy of logic are opened up, and on all of them what the author has to say deserves and will repay study. But the work has a specific aim and one very definite problem, the various sides of which are in gradual succession opened up. It will probably convey the best idea of the question and of the solution the author has to offer, if in this notice as full an exposition as is possible in the limits be offered, following the order adopted in the book itself, but omitting what may be judged or what is allowed by the author to be of secondary im- portance. The book falls into eight sections. The first, entitled " The Scientific Need for a Theory of Knowledge, "formulates the question and gives certain historical notices that render its import more de- finite. The second, 3ntitled, " Pure Experience as a Principle of Knowledge," and the third, "General Significance of Logical Neces- sity as a Principle of Knowledge " (or, as it might have been called, " Thought as Principle of Knowledge "), are relatively the most important, and contain in brief what is special to Prof. Volkelt's view of the whole question. Section iv., " On Knowledge as the Co-operation of Experience and Thought," states from another side what has been reached in the preceding sections. Sections v. and vi., "The Subjective Factors of Knowledge" and "The Notion (Begriff) in its Significance for Knowledge," are excellent contri- butions to general logic, if that term be allowed in its largest sense. Section vii., " Kinds and Sources of Uncertainty in Knowledge," is likewise logical in character, forming the needful introduction to methodology. The concluding section discusses the solution given in the light of various problems more or less connected with it. The stress of the whole book lies evidently in the formulation of the problem, and accordingly it is to the first section that one turns with greatest interest. The distinction between the several sciences, special knowledges as one might call them, which for their part assume without further question that objective knowledge is somehow possible, and a theory of knowledge which can evidently start with no such assump- tion, is the introduction whereby Prof. Volkelt advances to the discussion of Erkenntnisstlieorie as a science without previous assumptions. The need of such a science he regards as sufficiently made out by reason of the well-grounded doubt that may be entertained regarding the very possibility of know- ledge. Such doubt arises from the incontestable consideration