Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/253

This page needs to be proofread.

240 W. L. DAVIDSON : having been used for domestic or other purposes, if, i.e., they have been obviously made into implements. Under the first head, too, would come all inorganic objects that bear the marks of human workmanship upon them. Then, after utilities, would come the material out of which the useful articles were formed stone, bone, horn, wood, &c. ; but only in a subordinate position. Thus does the archaeologist make the most of his subject ; for thus is indicated to us in any given case, not only that we have here an object that Taas come down to us from the past, and that may be iden- tified by us the horn of a deer, the trunk of a tree, the tusk of a boar, &c. but, further, that in this object we have something told us about man's past ways and habits : the tree is formed into a canoe, the deer's horn into a pick or club, the stone into an axe or hammer. And there is also indicated, through the subdivisions, the particular number of kinds of article that each material was used for : bones being formed into needles, pins, knobs, combs, &c. ; stones into hammers, axes, clubs ; clay into pottery of various sorts ; and so forth. So that, even in classifying Relics, there is a better and a worse method ; and that method is best which sheds the greatest light upon the collection, which displays best the correlated properties among the objects, and which thereby furthers best the end or object that the science of archaeology sets before it. The same rule is applicable to the grouping of the various Meanings of a word, where these meanings are numerous and of real significance. Let us take the philosophical term Dialectic, and see how the principle works. The significa- tions here might be arranged in various ways, and each way has its own recommendations. We may follow the chronolo- gical order i.e., we may take up the great names in philo- sophy and set down the sense in which each used the term from early times down to the present day ; or we may throw the meanings into logical groups apart from the chronologi- cal sequence. The chronological order would be the best if it were also the order of evolution, i.e., if each successive meaning were a distinct development of that which preceded it, and if there were no overlapping in the significations.' But, unfortunately, neither condition is complied with. There is no steady advance as the ages pass, but the usage of a later age, as one comes down the stream, frequently reverts to that of an age long prior, and more than one signification is current at a particular time. Thus, if we place the authorities in chronological sequence Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, &c. ; Cicero, Cassiodorus, Boethius ;