Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/44

II." IDIOPSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS." By Professor HENEY SIDGWICK. IN MIND No. 39 I reviewed Dr Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory. A reply from Dr. Martirieau, somewhat longer than my review, appeared in the next number. On reading this reply; it seemed to me desirable to deal in different ways with the historical and the theoretical portions of it. Dr. Mar- tineau's answers to my criticisms on his historical work convinced me that there was nothing to be gained by a prolonged and enlarged controversy on this part of the subject : a brief and immediate rejoinder, which I gave in the following number, was all that seemed desirable. The case was otherwise with the further explanations which Dr. Martineau had been led to give of his own views : since, on the one hand, these threw new lights on certain parts of Dr. Martineau's doctrine, which rendered necessary a partial modification of my objections to it ; while, on the other hand, they suggested to me that possibly a fuller statement of these objections might render them more intelligible to Dr. Martineau, and to any others who may share his ethical views. The appearance of a second edition of Dr. Martineau's book seems to afford a favourable opportunity for this fuller statement ; and, for the convenience of the reader, I shall take up the question de novo, and shall not refer except in one note to my original article ; while, at the same time, I shall try to avoid any mere repetition of arguments there urged. I will begin by criticising an unwarranted assumption as it appears to me which underlies Dr. Martineau's whole procedure. He characterises his ethical system as " idiopsy- chological " : that is, he professes to give the "story" that the " moral consciousness tells of itself," or " what the moral sentiment has to say of its own experience". And he appears generally to entertain no doubt that there is one and the same " story " to be told in all cases ; that if the same ques- tion be definitely put to the moral consciousness of any number of different individuals, they will return definitely the same answer as his own. He holds, at any rate, 1 that all 1 ii. 16, 17. The references are throughout to the second edition (vol. ii).