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NEW BOOKS. 469 76) the position is taken up that in each case one of the opposed positions of Hamilton's (and of Kant's) antinomies with respect to the infinite of space and time, is really self-contradictory, and the other adequately con- ceivable ; and suggestions of the true doctrine of the qualitative nature of the conception of the infinite are found in Kant, and still more in Mill and Clifford. The short penultimate chapter (v., pp. 77-89) on " The Conceiv- able and the Existent" is intended to make clearer what it is precisely that the author is trying to prove ; which is, not the existence but the conceiv- ability of the infinite. The infinity of space, for example, may be conceiv- able, and yet it does not follow either that space is infinite or that we can know it to be infinite. All that has been done is to get rid of a prelimi- nary objection to entertaining any question as to its infinity. The last chapter (" The Conceivability of the Infinite "), as readers of MIND will remember, aims at showing by quotations from leading representatives of modern Nominalism, that " the operation of conceiving an infinite line " by abstracting the idea of a possible endless progression, is " in nature identical " with " the operation of forming a concept " as they describe it. Some Problems of Philosophy. By ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, Professor of Philosophy in Columbia College. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886. Pp. 170. This little book consists of a series of essays in which the author states very suggestively some of the leading problems of philosophy, with the aim, first, of making the opposing positions clear, and then of working towards a doctrine that may be described as Critical Idealism. In the opening essay (" The Difficulties of Philosophy") he sets forth the " Dogmatic," the " Sceptical " and the " Critical " positions ; his purpose here being to insist upon " the supreme necessity of thorough analysis before a metaphysical principle can be established ". "In proportion as the difficulties of pure Metaphysics are recognised," he goes on, " are not cast aside by the sceptic nor overlooked by the dogmatist, the other branches of Philosophy will be progressive. Psychology should be especially benefited, for more than half the differences between different schools of Psychology are differences with respect to metaphysical doctrines which should not impede the tranquil progress of the inductive science of mind ". An essay on " The Problem of Physiological Psychology " (vi.) is particularly good. The problem of the relations of Mind and Body is exactly appreciated, and the importance for psychology of the study of the physiological conditions of consciousness, without neglect of introspection, is well brought out. The short essay on "The Problem of the Will" (ix., pp. 77-9) is also very effective. For the author, the fundamental problem of philosophy is the nature of causation, and to this he finds himself constantly brought back in his discussion of other questions. The last essay (xviii., pp. 123-70) is an express discussion, historical and critical, of " The Doctrine of Cause and Effect " . The true solution of the problem of causation, the author decides, can only be arrived at after a previous determination of the true theory of knowledge. We must not begin by dogmatic propositions about Nature. " We must explain the principles of knowledge first, for Nature is only what we know." The law of causality is then found to be " a law of knowledge, -i.e., a law of judgment a form of Thought". ** The necessity of that judgment depends on the existence of mind," of which nature, as we know it, is the product. (1) Outlines of Psychology. (2) Outlines of ^Esthetics. (3) Outlines of Logic and of Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Dictated Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. Translated and Edited by GEORGE T. LADD, Professor of Philosophy in Yale College, Boston : Ginn & Co., 1886-7. Pp. xi., 157 ; xii., ll3 ; viii., 184.