Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/578

ME. F. H. BEADLEY'S ANALYSIS OF MIND. 565 scribing the individual's development, notwithstanding that the individual himself has no such presentations at the outset. One reason given for excluding these conceptions from psycho- logy is, that they are neither facts nor laws, but " rags of meta- physics," and " we have in science to do solely with events and their laws". Now if this objection had been urged by some of our excellent friends the physiologists, I should probably admit it at once : they are making valuable contributions to the super- structure of psychology, and it is best not to put them out of conceit with us by raising difficulties, the force of which they would not feel. But with a writer who has given to the world a book on the principles of knowledge it is otherwise. Accordingly I venture to request that writer to consider and to explain to us what he understands by " doing in science " ; and in the mean- time confess that I have assumed that science deals with facts only by means of ideas. Brute facts will never make a science of themselves, and we cannot get ideas out of them till we have put ideas in. Further, when the physiologists (for whose superior ability and surpassing devotion, by the way, Mr. Bradley has extraordinary respect) talk of rags of metaphysics, we know what they mean, and take their rebukes meekly. But from a philosopher we reasonably look for more precision. It is one thing to keep science clear of ontological speculations ; it is quite another to refuse to give adequate definitions of conceptions that have various implications within science itself. The first procedure is wise and sober; the second is slovenly and confusing. We may be quite sure the first is what Mr. Bradley intends; but then comes the question : How are we to ascertain the concep- tions that for psychology are simple and ultimate ? So far as I can see, Mr. Bradley does not tell us. My own view was that those conceptions, and those only, are ultimate for a particular science, whether actually so or not, which, like compound radi- cals in organic chemistry, so to say, never require analysis within the science itself. Tried by this test, Mr. Bradley's " working definitions" prove insufficient. In all other sciences the term ' phenomenon ' and its equiva- lents may be used without more ado : in psychology they cannot. Now, Mr. Bradley talks of presentations as if they were simply phenomena : he proposes to " take ' given ' or ' presented ' not as implying a donation or even a relation to an Ego, but rather for that which is simply" (p. 364, fin.). This is all very well when we are busied with the external world ; for, though it is obvious that given and presented always imply donation or relation, yet the term implied can be neglected when we are talking of sounds, or colours, or storms, or trees ; they are there for anybody and everybody, for nobody in particular. When, therefore, we speak of chemical ' phenomena or astronomical ' phenomena, it is only to distinguish one kind of phenomena from another. But