Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 12.djvu/640

NEW BOOKS. 627 Ideas of "virtue" and "merit" then arise, which imply spontaneity of action and differences between different persons, as regards the degree of spontaneity ; the virtue or merit of an action or a character being greater in proportion as there is less direct consciousness of any external sanction. Before the ideas of "positive law," "natural law," "justice," &c., arise in their distinction, there is a general notion of social " fitness " (convenienza) ; and there always remain, outside the kinds of conduct regulated by the central power, other kinds of conduct, to which not the action of the central power, but only a less definite form of the social sanction is appli- cable. The requirements of the ideal of human society, expressed in terms of the analogy between the social and the biological organism, are : (1) Autonomy of the parts ; (2) Prevention of mutual violence ; (3) Distinct constitution of the central power ; (4) Its constitution by selection of the best, in dependence on the will of the parts, in virtue of their social idealities, and to the end of the protection of the co-ordinated autonomies of the society ; (5) Just and stable organisation and subordination of the parts corresponding to the stable and just organisation and efficacy of action of the power (p. 38). To every right corresponds a duty ; but every right is not at the same time a duty (pp. 130-1). The right to carry into effect an impulse towards the social ideal is at the same time a duty for the person exercising the right, while the right to exercise egoistic activities is in itself simply a right, though it may imply the duty of other persons not to interfere. Rights at once constitute the social organism and are deter-' mined by it (p. 227). The State has for its functions " the protection of the rights of all," " the acquisition of prosperity," " moral im- provement " (p. 249). Thus conceived, it is "the pure and complete realisation of social ideality, or of the principle of anti-egoistic good, of moral good ; in a word, of good for the sake of good ". From this outline of some of its leading positions the importance of Prof. Ardigo's ethico- political work will be evident. As some account of his psychological and general philosophical point of view has already been given in MIND, less need be said here of the two remaining works of the present volume. It may suffice to mention that the last, on The Psychological Fact of Perception, starts from a critical examination of Prof. Sergi's Physiological Theory of Perception (noticed in MIND vi. 154), and that the author's own doctrine is that " simple observation . . . gives only pure sensation ; for this to become a perception, it must be conjoined with experiment " (p. 345). FRANCESCO DE SARLO. Studi sul Danvinismo. Pp. 186. Also I Soyni : Saggio psicologico. Pp. 32. Napoli : A. Tocco & Co., 1887. The greater part (pp. 5-116) of the first of these pieces is devoted to an exposition of the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection and a defence of it against objectors; the author then discusses "Problems started by Darwinism," "Darwinism and Philosophy," " Social Darwinism," " Linguistic Darwinism," " Darwinism and Chemistry," " Darwinism and Astronomy ". With all its importance, " Darwinism is not the Alpha and Omega of science," and "much less can it be the foundation of a philosophy. Philosophy and Darwinism are ideas that are perfectly separate but do not oppose one another. Not so Darwinism and Theology ; for dogma and research, science and faith, are ideas that absolutely exclude one another." There can be no " social Darwinism ". Social progress is not essentially the result of a struggle, but of intelligence ; the various forms of social rivalry being "simple stimuli". Physical, chemical and astronomical phenomena are not made clearer by attempts to explain them as cases of natural selection. They are the expression of more general laws, into which the idea of a utility to be served does not enter. It is incorrect, for