Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/343

A CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS. 331 (Reid) ; as that between the Subsidiary Faculties and the Elaborative Faculty (Sir TV. Hamilton) ; that between Sensual Feeling and Intellectual Feeling (Kant) ; that between Harmony and Conflict (Herbart) ; that between Formal Feelings and Qualitative Feelings (Vaitz) ; those between Affections, Moods, and Passions (Wundt) ; those between Direct, Reflective, and Imaginative Emotions (Hodgson) ; and it may be added, that between Representa- tive and Re-representative Feelings ; but is based, like the classification of Cognitions previously proposed, on variations of the correspondence between the organism and its environ- ment ; of which correspondence Feeling is a cardinal factor. The term Feeling, like the term Cognition and several other terms used in psychology, is used in two distinct senses. It is used to express a process, and also to express the result of that process. Just as Cognition may mean either the process or act of cognising or the state of mind remaining on the completion of this act, so may Feeling be understood either as the process of feeling or the state of mind resulting from the process. It is in the latter sense that the term will be most used here, and the context will show clearly when the other meaning is implied. Expressed in terms of the correspondence, the process of Feeling is the correspondence of states in the organism with interactions between the organism and the environment ; and the states so corresponding are the individual Feelings. The correctness of this expression I must ask the reader to take upon trust for the present. If he will accept it provi- sionally for the sake of convenience, I shall hope eventually to secure his permanent adhesion, but the arguments and evidence necessary to establish it are far too extensive to be introduced parenthetically in this place, and will require separate treatment. Evidence that the expression is imper- fect will arise at once, but the same evidence will indicate the qualifications that must be attached to it, and when they are added it will be found, I believe, to cover the facts with as much accuracy as our language admits of. If Feeling is the state in the organism which corresponds with an interaction between the organism and the environ- ment, then Feeling must vary as this interaction varies, and it must be possible to obtain a classification of feelings from a classification of the actions. If we take this principle as a basis of classification and apply it to Feeling as a whole, planes of cleavage start to view, separating the mass into divisions and subdivisions that appear so coherent internally, and so clearly demarcated