THE PROBLEMS OF HYPNOTISM. 501 to be eliminated, his theory has a certain symmetry and explanatory power. It gives a plausible account, involving neither consciousness nor volition, of the power of the simple sound ' go,' to produce an immediate corresponding move- ment of the ' subject ' the merit of the explanation being the easily conceivable picture of the nervous events which it supposes, and which are quite on a par with the recognised facts of reflex action. But when, e.g., a long series of orders is thoughtfully and painfully carried out, long after they were given a phenomenon not uncommon in ' mesmeric ' exhibitions it seems impossible to adapt the old (or any other) neat and symmetrical hypothesis of the nervous pro- cesses to the new phenomena ; and the word ' reflex ' can be applied to the latter, if at all, only in the peculiar and carefully guarded sense which confines it to their jHydhitul aspect. It seems hardly possible that Heidenhaiu should have missed seeing this, had he waited to formulate his theories until he had witnessed some of the higher pheno- mena in their more striking forms. As soon as the ele- ments of consciousness and volition are clearly recognised as active in such phenomena, it surely must equally be recog- nised that the fundamental peculiarity of the condition is simply the absorption of those elements into the one sug- gested channel of attention or expectancy, and is thus quite amoved from the lower plane of physical ' reflex '. So far, then, our formula of conscious or psychic reflex
- tion, as expressing the true peculiarity of the higher
hypnotic manifestations, has been defended against two )rts of over-simplification ; that which ignores the part played by the mind in the phenomena ; and that which, 3cepting the part played by the mind, fails to see that its lifferentiating feature is the liability to respond to sugges- tions with the same mechanical readiness as a stimulated mscle displays when the normal inhibitory influence is withdrawn. It is only stating the condition thus indicated other words, to say that the heart of the problem lies not consciousness but in u-UL And here another important distinction presents itself. The hypnotic automatism must not be conceived as necessarily implying any abrogation whatever of the will, taken as the sense of desire or impulse. That element admits of all degrees. It may be absent altogether, and the ' subject ' may perform his acts, con- sciously indeed, but with complete indifference in which case nothing is commoner than for him to believe and to assert afterwards that he could have avoided doing those
