Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/569

SEPARATION OF QUESTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY. 557 marking the exact sweep or scope of a problem. This takes a twofold meaning according as the problem is (1) one referring to a definite subject, restricted to a single department of knowledge, but liable to being misunderstood because ambiguous in state- ment ; or (2) one referring to a subject which has various aspects and so may be treated of in various departments, the particular aspect under consideration being determined by regard to the department in which the question is asked. (1) Suppose the question put, "Is or is not the Will free '?" Our first duty is to ascertain, by a critical sifting of the spheres of action, in what spheres Liberty can with plausibility be said to reside and in what spheres it cannot be allowed a footing : otherwise, we run the risk of falling into either of the two extremes giving an over-extension to the question, or narrowing it too far. We over-extend it, when we fail to perceive that freedom is conditioned by consciousness, and that all unconscious and all sub-conscious actions are excluded from our consideration. We over-restrict it, when (with Cicero, Kant, and many moderns) we tie down the question to moral liberty to freedom from the bondage of the animal or lower principles of our nature and submission to the moral law ; forgetting that Consciousness is wider than Conscience, and that moral freedom does not exhaust the matter. Again, we over-extend it, when we treat Conscious- ness of freedom as identical with Conviction of freedom ; for, not only are the two things entirely different in themselves, 1 but the latter is far wider than the former. We unduly limit it, when we confine the point to one single kind of act, e.g., deliberation. Before we can hope to attack successfully the problem, "I* the will free?" we must first settle with ourselves the preliminary inquiry, " Where, on the supposition of freedom, are we likely to find it?" Similarly with the question, "What is the ultimate ethical end? " Apart from the ambiguity residing in the word " end," 2 this is most commonly regarded as equivalent to the other, " What do men consciously set before them as their ultimate 1 Consciousness accompanies an act of choice, Conviction follows it ; and, whereas the former is most vivid during a conflict or struggle, it is after the conflict is over and we have lost in other words, it is when we begin to upbraid ourselves for having yielded to temptation, that our conviction is strongest that we might have done differently from what we did. More- over, conviction has also a forward reference. I am convinced of my ability to do such and such a thing to-morrow, or to resist an approaching temptation ; but alas ! when to-morrow comes or the temptation ari I find myself powerless. Past and future both belong to conviction ; con- sciousness is concerned solely with the present. - It may mean (1) that in which we rest satisfied, as when it is said (by Butler, for example) that food is the end of hunger or virtue the end of conscience ; or (2) final cause, intended purpose, " primary use and in- tention :) . 38