Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/609

c. STUMPF'S TOSPSYCHOLOGIE, i. 597 is, the van-ing degree of rapidity of progress (from slow to rapid, then to slow again) till the maximum-point is reached, are then discussed in the light of this theory ; also the facts of concomi- tant or transferred increase of facility (Mitiibung), as when, by the exercise of the right hand in learning to write, a considerable aptitude of the left hand in symmetrical movements develops itself. These facts show, as Yolkmann pointed out, that practice in sense-judgments does not act upon the external organs or alter the degree of sensibility, a conclusion which, our author adds, is borne out by the varying course of progress. The antagonist of practice, namely, the action of fatigue on sensibility and on attention, is then slightly touched on. So far the author has been considering immediate sense-judg- ments on which we judge of sensations and of their relations by direct inspection and reproduction. In addition to these there are mediate judgments, where we decide by help of external or heterogeneous criteria which we know from experience to coexist with the impressions with which we are concerned. Thus, we can judge of the presence of certain upper-tones in a clang by the peculiar clang-feeling, of the height of a tone by the muscular sensations experienced in reproducing it, and so forth. From these mediate judgments, further, the author distinguishes trans- ferred (ubertragene), as when we judge that a table looked at sideways is round, when we mean that we should see it to be round if the optic axes were at right angles to its surface. In this way we obtain the following scheme of judgments (A) Direct, (a) Immediate, and (6) Mediate ; (B) Transferred. An interesting section follows on analysis and comparison. There are four ground-relations in or between sensuous contents about which we can judge, namely, plurality, rise or increase, similarity, and coalescence. The noting of a plurality is called an act of analysis ; that of one of the other relations, an act of reference or comparison. In addition to these judgments of the first order, there are others of a higher order in which we decide about relations of relations. Some valuable observations are made respecting the determination of these relations generally, e.g., that the related contents must simultaneously present them- selves to the mind either as actual sensations or as images. The difficulties of physiological explanation with respect to these processes of analysis and comparison are referred to, not without a certain touch of playful irony. The relations are then con- sidered separately. Under analysis, the relation of the process to discrimination is touched on, but the highly interesting question of its relation to assimilation or classification is not handled. The idea of rise or increase is illustrated best in the intensities of all classes of sensation. The question whether it should be applied to qualities, e.g., of tones, is reserved. Particularly instructive is the sub-section on similarity in its relation to equality and to difference. Similarity cannot be conceived by