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mate of the characters that surround us. Towards some we feel attracted, by others repelled; some, while we scarcely know why, awaken our esteem; and others, without sufficient reason, may be thought of with aversion and mentioned with disgust. The quality of our taste, the predominance of our feelings, or even the casualty of circumstance, may produce associations of ideas, confirmed by habit into predilection or enmity. To search for the cause of these varying opinions, to examine the foundation of these attachments and prejudices, and to reduce them all to the rule of equity is the office of the judgment, that most important effort of the reasoning powers. In forming our estimate of mankind we are too apt to be influenced by the distinctions which we perceive among them; and to view with a great degree of deference the wealthy, the powerful, and the honourable. But the distinctions in society, which are wisely appointed by Providence for the ultimate good of the whole, are no criterion[1] of individual merit. The vicious, the unprincipled, and the cruel, often arrive at the summit of power, and are seen wielding the sceptre of dominion, and clad in the robe of royalty; while the virtuous pass through life in obscurity, unheeded and perhaps unknown. Wealth, honour, and power are often acquired by injustice, preserved with pain, and lost in a moment; so that at once fluctuating and inconclusive, they can give no character
