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enterprises in Siberia, over which its control is limited. The system is so arranged that it works well whenever the interests of the Russian authorities, as reflected through the responsible agent, coincide with the views of the foreign board of directors. When, however, there is disagreement, the foreign board has little real control over the responsible agent, who may become the tool of questionable and even illegal influences. This was certainly the case in the Lena goldfields. Here there were two boards of directors, one in England and one in Russia, the latter being in place of the "responsible agent," who is usually appointed by the foreign board. While the English board supplied the capital, the Russian board only was legally recognized by the Russian authorities, and was thus actually responsible for the management; moral responsibility for that management, however, rested with the English board as well, which supplied the capital and took the profit, although in Russia it had no legal status. By ambiguous laws that are capable of various interpretations, foreign capital is often placed at the mercy of local officials and managers; and it is to the interest of unscrupulous officials that the system should continue. London city financiers may perhaps be able through political influence to protect their own interests, when the necessity arises, but the investing public has no such power, and, as far as investments in Siberian mining enterprises are concerned, are absolutely at the mercy of conditions over which they exercise no control. Moreover, the moral responsibility, although it may not appeal to Lombard Street, probably appeals to British public opinion. In a word,