VII
THE ULTIMATE CONSTITUENTS
OF MATTER[1]
I WISH to discuss in this article no less a question than the ancient metaphysical query, "What is matter?" The question, "What is matter?" in so far as it concerns philosophy, is, I think, already capable of an answer which in principle will be as complete as an answer can hope to be; that is to say, we can separate the problem into an essentially soluble and an essentially insoluble portion, and we can now see how to solve the essentially soluble portion, at least as regards its main outlines. It is these outlines which I wish to suggest in the present article. My main position, which is realistic, is, I hope and believe, not remote from that of Professor Alexander, by whose writings on this subject I have profited greatly.[2] It is also in close accord with that of Dr. Nunn.[3]
Common sense is accustomed to the division of the world into mind and matter. It is supposed by all who have never studied philosophy that the distinction between mind and matter is perfectly clear and easy, that the two do not at any point overlap, and that only a fool or a philosopher could be in doubt as to whether any given entity is mental or material. This simple faith
- ↑ An address delivered to the Philosophical Society of Manchester in February, 1915. Reprinted from The Monist, July, 1915.
- ↑ Cf. especially Samuel Alexander, "The Basis of Realism," British Academy, Vol. VI.
- ↑ "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception?" Proc. Arist. Soc., 1909-10, pp. 191-218.
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