APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
plate the collectivization of agriculture. Many farmers resisted as best they could, only to be overwhelmed in a matter of weeks by party organizers fanatically devoted to the dictates of political doctrine and socialist agricultural science. Defeat bred apathy among the peasantry, and through the application of threats and incentives inspired East German farmers to outproduce their counterparts in neighboring East European countries. In human terms, the happy, smiling peasantry portrayed by the regime is doubtless a great distortion, but still the original bitterness seems to have dissipated and the collectivized farmer apparently finds life tolerable.
By contrast with the equivocal result in the agricultural sector, educational reform has definitely bolstered the regime. By and large, the changes undertaken have proven acceptable, and the credit goes to the government. The old European class system, which permits the advancement of only a small elite, has largely been scrapped, and a mass schooling system has been substituted. The formerly submerged levels of society may now achieve according to their ability, and their political reliability. Principal emphasis is placed on vocational training and on socialist indoctrination, which is pervasive. Practical work programs in the factory or on the farm are emphasized as an educational adjunct even for those hoping to enter the professions. This factor of socialist learning is equaled in unpopularity by one other: as in other areas, also in education and science there persists the strong odor of Soviet dominance and exploitation. Russian is given first priority in the study of foreign languages. Research projects are frequently oriented toward Soviet needs. Soviet dogma, as it extends into the physical and natural sciences, is stressed. In the classroom, life in the West is presented in an extremely restricted and highly colored format, thus reinforcing the mental isolation of the student. He may opt out to believe what the teacher imparts, but still he will be able to acquire precious little ground on which to build a counterbelief.
In the instance of at least one institution, the military, the regime has sought popular acceptance by retaining rather than abandoning "the best of the old tradition." The Volksarmee presents with its goose-stepping troopers, neat formations, rumbling tanks, and heavy Germanic marches a remarkable resemblance to the forces of former times. Aspects of socialist modernity also creep in, however, including: the shaping of an officer corps representative of the party and the proletariat, the lowering of caste barriers between officers and men, and the reordering of German military history to highlight "revolutionary episodes."
East Germany nurtures its army as a prominent symbol of the integrity of the state. Totaling almost 120,000 men, the East German armed force exceeds in numbers only those of Hungary and Albania in Eastern Europe. However, relative to population it has almost as many men in uniform as West Germany. The army is clearly subordinate to the civilian officials of the state and is virtually incapable of exercising political influence. In addition, there is doubt about its combat reliability. Ultimately the question that has hung over the Volksarmee is the same as that which has haunted its West German counterpart: "Would German fight German?" The proposition may seem highly theoretical, but still it exists. And, in the East German case, any answer other than a strong affirmative bespeaks doubt about the endurance of the state.
Alert to this frailty, the regime continually seeks—with some success—to bolster the morale of the army. Plaudits are showered on it by the government, and extensive favorable coverage is given in the media. Military parades are held with considerable frequency in East Berlin even though they violate the terms of Four-Power Agreements on the status of the city. In addition the armed forces increasingly have been permitted to play a more prominent role in Warsaw Pact exercises, though hardly one that challenges the reality of Soviet dominance in Pact affairs. The Volksarmee itself is molded along the lines of the Soviet forces, is supplied chiefly with Soviet equipment, and, quite naturally, is subject to considerable Soviet influence in its day-to-day operations. The approximately 333,000-man Soviet component—euphemistically known as "the friends"—maintains a low public profile in East Germany, but by its presence helps insure the life of the regime.
From 1945 onward, the Protestant Evangelical Church has represented the longest lived holdout against the dominance of the state. The church initially sought to operate on the basis of one Germany, in principle a denial of East Germany's right to exist. The church was also identified with the old society, whereas to many pastors the new secular authorities were the representation of "godless Marxism." In
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
