APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
Big Brother and Others (c)
In the successful quest for status, East Germany has had the decisive backing of the Soviet Union. For Moscow, East Germany represents the Soviets' forward most military-political position in Europe. It is an important industrial partner, and above all else its continued existence obviates "the German threat." Soviet troops stationed in East Germany provide a guarantee of the endurance of the regime. The U.S.S.R. takes about 40% of East German exports and is the chief supplier of essential raw materials. By its accomplishments, e.g., space flights, it radiates an aura of socialist success in which East Germany may bask. For its part, East Germany has had a record of compliance that compares favorably with that of any other East European state.
The evident harmony of the Moscow-East Berlin relationship has been punctuated by some discordant notes over the years. In the postwar era, the Soviets plundered their sector of Germany, hesitated before approving the creation of the GDR, domineered over it for years, failed to deliver Berlin to it or to sign a separate peace treaty with it despite frequent promises. In the early days, the proud Nordics had little choice but to accept humiliation by their Slavic mentors.
As East Germany became stronger and hence less dependent, the leadership undertook a new course. It frequently finessed Moscow's demands, openly pledging loyalty to the Soviets and then quietly proceeding the German way. In the post-Khrushchev era, the Ulbricht regime, perhaps exaggerating its importance to the bloc, went a step further. It ceased giving the Soviets full credit for all socialist advances and with evident delight pronounced some of its own accomplishments superior. As the elder statesman of bloc leaders, Ulbricht increasingly advised Moscow on proper courses of action, particularly on Berlin where East German interests were involved. Finally a more pliable leader was found in the person of Erich Honecker. From this episode it became clear that on crucial issues Moscow's desires still prevailed over Pankow's, to the detriment of the image of full East German sovereignty. In domestic affairs the regime clearly enjoys the dominant role, but overall it remains only a junior partner in Soviet-sponsored ventures.
"Friendship among peoples" is one of East Germany's most heavily stressed precepts. Yet even in Eastern Europe East Germans often are resented, since they are viewed more as Germans than as socialist brethren. Alluding to past Teutonic depredations, many East Europeans are inclined to believe that Germans, East or West, simply "cannot overcome their national character." As inheritors of a Western cast of mind and a Protestant morality, East Germans are also considered to be "different." For their part, many in East Germany would agree that they themselves are "different," and also "better."
The regime has lived in mortal fear that incipient liberalism in the established East European nations may spread into East Germany and produce infections, perhaps even convulsions among the populace. Broadly, it was for this reason that East Germany was a prime mover in the bloc's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Once again the world was treated to the spectacle of Germans marching into Czechoslovakia.
Despite underlining tensions and occasional flashpoints, the East Germans remain generally cooperative allies in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. Within this context, Pankow looked to the other allied capitals to back its claims to sovereignty and boost its campaign for recognition. Their frequent failure to do so vigorously increased the regime's sense of insecurity, and at times induced among East German leaders concern that their Eastern neighbors would succumb to the wiles of West Germany, strike a deal with Bonn, and thus leave East Germany in an isolated and weakened condition.
A new confidence born of acceptance has partially displaced such concerns, and has imbued the regime with a sense of belonging. Still, old fears die hard among the East Germans faithful, and they remain vigilant against any infidelity on the part of East Europeans.
On the basis of experience, the East Germans have never been quite able to trust the Soviets. In 1952 Stalin proposed a draft treaty offering reunification of
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
