APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
Two Germanies or One? (c)
It has not been easy for East Germany to live next door to the dramatic prosperity which burst forth in West Germany's capitalistic-pluralistic society. Pankow on the one hand belittles Bonn's economic success and on the other promises to outstrip it by way of Marxian socialism. Extending its effort to the breaking point has brought some results, but has not dispelled the sense of frustration and inferiority of coming off second best in almost any observable comparison with West Germany, which to begin with has two and a half times the territory and nearly four times the population of East Germany.
In marching to its own drummer, the GDR has written off the idea of German reunification—a notion it had occasionally extolled for propaganda purposes and which is still held up in West Germany as an article of faith. In one of his more accurate descriptions of the German situation, Walter Ulbricht told his Communist Party Congress in April 1967: "Two separate German states have been created, and they have pursued completely different paths of development. To unify them would be tantamount to combining Fire and Water. It is unrealistic to talk about unification now." On balance, it appears that the former East German ruler has a point. Time and circumstance have lessened tanglier and fraternal ties. Regionalism has taken hold, and each state has been welded into military and economic pacts inimical one to the other. Each is prideful in its accomplishments and separate identity. Each sees itself as the true fatherland, reserving for itself the best of the Germanic past, and places the onus of unrighteousness on the other. Neither appears disposed in the near future to modify its style sufficiently to accommodate the other.
Present-day relations between the two Germanies are heavily influenced by a residue of distrust. For years West Germany treated East Germany as a political and social outcast, an "untouchable" on the international scene. Bonn claimed the right to sole representation for Germany as a whole. Bonn spokesmen dismissed East Germany as "the Soviet occupied zone," "Middle Germany," and "the so-called German Democratic Republic." Only in the fall of 1969 did newly inaugurated Chancellor Brandt acknowledge the existence of "two German states," albeit in "one German nation"—a formula unacceptable to a Pankow regime intent on winning acceptance of a sovereign East Germany. By contrast with Bonn's attitude of disdain, East German spokesmen over the years verbally assaulted the Federal Republic with very special rage, some of it bordering on the obscene. More recently, the Brandt policy of reconciliation with the East has undercut Pankow's propaganda effort and the war of words abated in the early 1970's.
A sign of the mood of insecurity that still grips East Germany is the uncertainty with which relations with West Germany are conducted. On the one hand, the GDR in recent years has pressed a policy of separateness (Abgrenzung) in order to show in every small way the existence of two entirely different Germanies. It continues to regard West Germany as a menace to its existence, the governing SPD as a betrayer of socialism, and popular Chancellor Willy Brandt as a seducer of its people. On the other hand, East German leaders realize they must deal with West Germany in good faith, in order to solidify their political gains and to open new avenues to Western markets and technology. Seeking a solution to its dilemma, the GDR has agreed, somewhat grudgingly and with specific limitations, to permit those East-West German personal contacts spelled out in the General Relations Treaty. Simultaneously, the GDR has continued to bargain toughly on the official level with Bonn in behalf of East German interests. In small ways, such as the release of political prisoners, East Germany has made concessions to domestic and West German public opinion, but it remains doubtful that Pankow is ready to risk a full normalization of relations with the powerful magnet that is West Germany.
Looking ahead, observers of East Germany have mused for years as to what comes next. Many predicted that Ulbricht's passing from power would be a major turning point. As it turned out, observable changes have thus far been minimal. Erich Honecker has slightly relaxed domestic controls and allowed his
16
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1
